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Abstract 
Long hospital waits are causing frustrations among patients and are a fiercely debated topic in many OECD countries. Peo-
ples are worrying about that long waiting times might cause deterioration in patients’ health. This study investigates whether 
waiting times have any adverse impact on health in patients with cardiovascular diseases. Using a cross-national sample de-
rived from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we estimate the effects of waiting times on 
three different aspects of health outcomes: self-perceived physical and general health, self-perceived mental health and self-
perceived life-expectancy. Our results show that, on one hand, waiting times for non-emergency consultation have generally 
no adverse impacts on patients’ self-perceived health and, on the other hand, waiting times for emergency consultation and 
excessive waiting time are associated with several types of deteriorations in self-perceived general health and mental health. 
Hence, health policy should be designed to reduce emergency waits and excessive waits. Additionally, given that hospital 
waiting list is an ineffective way to ration excessive healthcare demand and creates a deadweight loss to the society, further 
research on its replacements are therefore required. 
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1 Introduction 
Queuing is a phenomenon which we encounter frequently in our everyday life. According to 
economic theory, queues may emerge as a result of excessive demand, which in turn occurred 
when the price of a certain good falls below the market-clearing level. (Lindsay & 
Feigenbaum, 1984). Among the various types of queues currently exist in our society, the 
queuing for health care is a subject of great importance. Long hospital waits have always been 
a sensitive political issue in many OECD countries, especially in those nations where the 
health care is publicly funded (Siciliani & Hurst, 2005). It causes large dissatisfaction among 
patients and has generally been considered as a problem resulted by inefficiency in the 
healthcare system (Bhattacharya, Hyde, & Tu, 2014). There are also profound concerns in that 
patients’ condition of health may deteriorate as a result of long waiting times. The question is, 
however, is it always the case? 
In this thesis, we use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) to investigate whether hospital waiting times might cause deteriorations in the self-
perceived health of patients who diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases (i.e. diseases that in-
volve the heart and circulatory system) in twelve OECD countries1. The main reason for fo-
cusing on cardiovascular diseases is the prevalence of the illness. According to WHO, cardio-
vascular diseases are the leading cause of death globally and responsible for over 17.7 million 
deaths each year (WHO, 2017a). It is also the main cause of mortality in most OECD coun-
tries and accounting for 32.3% of all deaths in 2013 (OECD, 2017). Research concerning 
waiting times’ effect on health outcomes of patients with cardiovascular diseases is therefore 
of high importance.  
 
1.1 Purpose and scope 
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effect of waiting times on health by an-
swering the following research question: 
Do long waiting times worsen health outcomes of patients with cardiovascular dis-
eases? 
                                                 
1 The number of countries included in this study is actually between 12 and 18. In the main analysis, 12 OECD 
countries are included; In the complementary analysis, 17 OECD countries plus Croatia are included. See section 
5 for more details.  
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Our study is designed to be comprehensive and our main objective is to estimate the effect of 
waiting times on three different aspects of health outcome, that is to say, the self-perceived 
physical and general health, the self-perceived mental health, and the self-perceived life ex-
pectancy. Based on the waiting time variables provided in SHARE, we conduct two separate 
analyses: a main analysis and a complementary analysis. The difference between them is the 
waiting time variables in the main analysis are continuous whereas in the complementary 
analysis, a binary variable is used (more details in section 4.1).  
Another purpose of our study is to form the basis for and give guidance to health policy deci-
sion-making. We will first interpret the results in combination with existing economic theories 
concerning waiting times and its role as a rationing mechanism. After that, a discussion about 
the policy implications of our results will be provided. According to Gravelle and Siciliani 
(2008b), rationing the demand for health services by waiting list is inefficient and creates a 
deadweight loss to the society. Hence, our starting point in the policy discussion is, if our re-
sults show that waiting times do affect the patients’ self-perceived health negatively, then the 
alternative rationing methods, such as threshold rationing and price rationing, should be con-
sidered. (Moscelli, Siciliani, & Tonei, 2016) 
We believe that the strength of our studies lies in its broad coverage of various aspects of 
health. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss how waiting times affect pa-
tients’ health. We are merely investigating if waiting times are associated with any form of 
deterioration of health, as well as the size of its effect, if there are any.  
 
1.2 Literature 
Although it may seem intuitive that waiting times adversely affects the patients’ health out-
comes, there is little evidence in supporting it. The amount of empirical research on whether 
the hospital waiting times affect patients’ health is limited, the majority of the currently exist-
ing literature on this topic is conducted using administrative data and focuses particularly on 
the post-surgery health outcomes. The outcome variables in these studies, such as inpatient 
mortality, post-surgical length of stay (Barton H Hamilton & Bramley‐Harker, 1999; Barton 
H. Hamilton, Hamilton, & Mayo, 1996; Barton H Hamilton, Ho, & Goldman, 2000) and read-
mission rate (Moscelli et al., 2016), are often measured in an objective manner. Studies that 
applied such strategy find that there is no evidence of waiting times’ adverse effect on health. 
In the case of emergency care, such as hip fracture surgery, Barton H. Hamilton et al. (1996) 
6 
 
employed a sample of 7848 hip fracture patients in Quebec and investigated the impact of pre-
surgery delay (i.e. waiting times following a hip fracture) on inpatient mortality and post-sur-
gical length of stay. Their conclusion is that waiting times have “little effect on either of the 
two outcome variables” (Barton H. Hamilton et al., 1996, p. 161). Similar results were ob-
tained by Barton H Hamilton and Bramley‐Harker (1999) when they investigated situations in 
the National Health Service (NHS) in England.  
There have been several studies conducted concerning waiting times in cardiovascular care. A 
majority of them are medical studies by nature, focusing mainly on the correlation between 
waiting times in elective cardiovascular surgeries, such as coronary artery bypass grafting 
(CABG), and mortality. Based on a sample of 5453 patients from two Swedish hospitals, 
Rexius et al. (2005) concluded that there is no evidence suggesting mortality after CABG sur-
gery would be influenced by prolonged waiting time. As for pre-surgery health outcomes, 
however, evidence has been found that queuing may increase the probability of dying while 
waiting for CABG surgery (Rexius et al., 2004). Compare to the medical literature, economic 
research concerning this issue is relatively scarce. Moscelli et al. (2016) made an attempt by 
using panel-data from the English Health Episode Statistics (HES), which covers the whole 
population of CABG patients in England, and concluded that long waits do not have any 
effect on in-hospital mortality, even though its effect on emergency readmission rate has 
weakly statistical significance.    
While most of the studies on waiting time are conducted on administrative data and focus on 
extreme measures of health like mortality, little attention has been paid to the health outcomes 
of a subjective character, e.g. life expectancy and self-perceived health. Only a very few 
numbers of published articles have attempted to investigate the effect of waits in cardiovascu-
lar care on subjective health outcomes. Jónsdóttir and Baldursdóttir (1998) investigated the 
impact of waits on the quality of life (QoL) of patients awaiting CABG in Iceland and found 
negative effects of waits on the patients’ work and daily life. A similar result in Canada is 
obtained by Sampalis et al. (2001) using a larger sample, in which 266 patients with coronary 
artery disease (CAD) were included. Their conclusion is that long waiting times are 
associated with significant decrease in patients’ physical and social functioning, both before 
and after the CABG surgery.   
Our study is therefore aimed to contribute to this scarcity of research in waiting times’ effect 
on self-perceived health. A key difference between our study and the studies of Sampalis et al. 
(2001) and Jónsdóttir and Baldursdóttir (1998) is that beside the self-perceived general health 
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and mental health, we also investigate the effect of waiting on self-perceived life expectancy 
(expressed as the probability of living after ten years). Additionally, we also use panel-level 
data to investigated whether waiting times have any adverse effect on patients’ mental health 
in future periods. Furthermore, unlike these two studies, whose data are collected at a certain 
country, our analyses are based on data from the SHARE survey – which is a cross-national 
sample, that means our results are not limited in a single country. It is also the first time 
SHARE is used in investigating the adverse effect of waiting times. Among the published 
journal articles, only two studies concerning hospital waits are done based on the data from 
SHARE. Mojon-Azzi and Mojon (2007) conducted a descriptive study on the waiting time of 
cataract surgery in ten European countries using data from the first wave of SHARE; Siciliani 
and Verzulli (2009) used the same data to investigate the association between hospital waiting 
time and the socio-economic status of the patient. We will follow their approach in choosing 
and calculating control variables, especially the calculation of adjusted household income.  
  
1.3 Structure 
This thesis will be structured as followed. Section 2 includes a brief overview of the 
healthcare system in those countries participated in the SHARE survey. Section 3 presents 
contemporary economic theories about different rationing mechanism in the healthcare mar-
ket. We introduce our methods in Section 4 and in Section 5, a description of the SHARE-sur-
vey is given. Section 6 presents our results. The robustness of the results is tested by a sensi-
tivity analysis, which described in Section 7. In Section 8, we will discuss the policy implica-
tions of our result in the light of the existing theories presented in section 3, we will also dis-
cuss some issues regarding the interpretations of our results and compare them with results 
from previous studies. Section 9 includes some concluding comments.  
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2 Background 
2.1 Healthcare systems in different OECD countries 
Before we enter the theory section, it is important to give the readers some background on dif-
ferent types of healthcare systems. Researchers usually divide the healthcare systems into 
three categories: national health system (also known as Beveridge model), social health insur-
ance system (also known as Bismarck model) and private insurance/private provider system 
(also known as American model) (Bhattacharya et al., 2014; Lameire, Joffe, & Wiedemann, 
1999; Van der Zee & Kroneman, 2007). In this section, we only introduce the Beveridge 
model and Bismarck model.   
2.1.1 The Beveridge model 
The Beveridge model is based on the egalitarian idea that everyone should have equal access 
to care regardless of his or her ability to pay. The healthcare system in Beveridge countries is 
characterised by (1) universal, single-payer insurance, which means that all citizens receive 
insurance coverage through the government and the insurance is financed by taxes rather than 
premiums; (2) public health care provisions, which means hospitals and clinics in Beveridge 
countries are funded by government. Physicians, nurses and other hospital personnel are also 
public employees; and (3) free or low-cost health care at government hospitals and clinics. 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2014). 
Sweden is an example of a country that applies a Beveridge system. The government in-
volvement in the Swedish healthcare system is presented in all three levels: at the national 
level, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs has the responsibility to decide policies 
with regard to overall health and healthcare; at the regional level, twelve county councils 
and nine regional bodies are responsible for financing, purchasing and providing all indi-
vidual health services; at the local level, 290 municipalities are responsible for elderly care 
and the care of the disabled (Mossialos et al., 2017; OECD, 2017c).  
Sweden has the third highest health spending in the EU, and 84 % of the health expendi-
tures are publicly financed, mainly by regionally and locally established taxes. However, 
the Swedish health care system does not completely follow the Beveridge model. A por-
tion of health facilities in Sweden are privately run (mainly primary care units) and user 
charges (in the form of flat-rate payments) for primary and specialist care exists, even in 
government-run hospitals. (OECD, 2017c)  
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The share of primary care units has increased fast since 2010 when a new national law to 
freely establish new primary care clinics with public reimbursement was passed. Residents 
are allowed to freely choose between primary care providers and contacting specialist di-
rectly (OECD, 2017c). Sweden has also implemented various types of maximum waiting-
times guarantee for patients since 1992, but the results are hardly successful and all regions 
are struggling to meet these rules (OECD, 2017c; Siciliani & Hurst, 2005). Other countries 
in this study that applies the Beveridge system are Denmark, Italy and Spain. (OECD, 
2017a) 
2.1.2 The Bismarck model 
Contrary to the Beveridge ideal of regulated and nationalised health care, the core values of 
the Bismarck system are economic liberty and solidarity (Bhattacharya et al., 2014). In a Bis-
marck model, the provision of health care is partially private (in particular primary and ambu-
latory health care), and partially public (Hassenteufel & Palier, 2007). Hospitals and clinics in 
Bismarck countries tend to be privately run and the supply of health care is, for that reason, 
more abundant than in Beveridge countries, which allows the patients more freedom in choos-
ing healthcare provider (Bhattacharya et al., 2014; Hassenteufel & Palier, 2007). Another key 
feature of the Bismarck model is the universal health insurance. In Bismarck countries, nearly 
all of the population are covered by some kind of health insurance. The public health insur-
ance is financed by payroll and other taxes, and not through insurance premiums based on in-
dividual health risks. This means that the healthier and wealthier member of the society are 
“paying” for the care of poorer and sicker member – a fine gesture of solidarity (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2014). Health insurance plan provided by private companies also exists in Bismarck 
countries, but they are often heavily regulated by the government (Mossialos et al., 2017; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2014). In some Bismarck nations, such as France and Japan, the govern-
ment are also involved in the price negotiations with hospitals. (Bhattacharya et al., 2014; 
Hassenteufel & Palier, 2007). 
Germany was the first country in the world to apply the social health insurance system. For 
all German citizens and permanent residents in the country, health insurance is mandatory 
and provided by two systems: statutory health insurance (SHI) and private health insurance 
(PHI) (Mossialos et al., 2017; OECD, 2017b).  
The SHI is competing, not-for-profit and nongovernmental (Mossialos et al., 2017). All 
employed citizens earning less than EUR 54,900 per annum (the threshold level in 2017) 
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are automatically covered by SHI. In 2017, there are totally 133 SHI in Germany and co-
vers 88% of the population. Meanwhile, the PHI covers approximately 10 % of the Ger-
man population. It is a substitutive insurance plan that follows a different rule for funding 
and financing compare with the SHI. Only peoples who earn above the EUR 54,900 
threshold, self-employed and civil-servant can choose this type of insurance (OECD, 
2017b).  
Contrary to the Swedish case, the government in Germany has virtually no role in both the 
provision of health care and the financing (Mossialos et al., 2017). The German healthcare 
system is decentralised, the federal government defines the legal framework and delegates 
the regulatory issues to the Federal Joint Committee (German: Gemeinsamer Bundesauss-
chuss), which is the highest decision-making body regarding health care in Germany. The 
Federal Joint Committee consists of representatives of associations of sickness funds, phy-
sicians/dentist, hospitals as well as patients’ representatives (without voting right). The 
Committee takes decisions on SHI benefits, reimbursement systems, and quality assurance. 
Each of the 16 states in Germany supervises the self-governing bodies at state level and are 
in charge of hospital investments and planning (OECD, 2017b). Other than Germany, 
countries like Austria, Belgium, France, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland also fol-
lows the Bismarck system. (Mossialos et al., 2017; OECD, 2017a) 
 
2.2 Waiting times for cardiovascular health care in different OECD countries 
Although we will not conduct our analyses based on the data from OECD Health Statistics, 
it still contains valuable information which is relevant to our research question, namely, 
the severity of the waiting-time problem in cardiovascular care. The OECD Health Statis-
tics provides data on waiting times for two medical procedures regarding cardiovascular 
diseases: (1) coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG), which is a common procedure for 
patients with serious coronary heart disease involving surgery that connects a healthy ar-
tery or vein from the body to the blocked coronary artery (NHLBI, n.d); and (2) percutane-
ous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), which is a less invasive procedure that im-
prove blood circulation to the heart by open up blocked coronary arteries. (Dugdale & 
Chen, 2012).  
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Among the twelve countries that participated in the first wave of SHARE, Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Greece are absent from the statistics since these 
countries do not monitor waiting times at national level (OECD Health Statistics, 2017a). 
Furthermore, the waiting times are also measured in different ways in different countries. 
For coronary bypass surgery, OECD Health Statistics provides data for Denmark, Israel, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. Lowest average days waiting from specialist as-
sessment to treatment in 2015 was 9 days in Israel, while the highest was 46.7 days in 
Spain. Average days waiting was 19.8 days in Denmark, 22.3 days in Italy and 34.5 days 
in the Netherlands. In Israel, only 1% of patients had to wait more than three months to re-
ceive treatment after seeing a specialist, while the same number was 1.3% in Denmark, 
4.9% in Italy and 17.8% in Spain (OECD Health Statistics, 2017b). OECD is unable to cal-
culate the mean waiting time for Sweden since the waiting time data in this country are 
presented in intervals (OECD Health Statistics, 2017a). The waiting times in Sweden are 
also measured in a different way. Statistics show that in 2016, 8.5% of the patients on the 
CABG waiting list have waited more than three months for the surgery (OECD Health 
Statistics, 2017b).  
Regarding percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), data from Denmark, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain are available. In 2015, the lowest average days waiting 
time from specialist assessment to treatment was 15.5 days in the Netherlands, followed by 
16.5 days in Denmark, 20.7 days in Spain and 21.3 days in Italy. When the waiting times 
are measured in percentage of all patients waiting more than 3 months, the situation is 
slightly different. In 2015, no one (0%) in Spain has to wait more than 3 months for a 
PTCA surgery after his or her first assessment with the specialist, while this percentage 
was 1.6% in Denmark and 3.3% in Italy. (OECD Health Statistics, 2017b)  
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3 Theories 
3.1 Hospital waiting time in economic theory 
In the economic theory, queues may emerge under these two circumstances: (1) as a by-prod-
uct of fluctuations in market demand or supply (or both), where the market failed to adjust in-
stantaneously; (2) when prices of a good is below or above the market-clearing level. The 
queueing for health care, which is a common phenomenon of countries who adopt the Beve-
ridge model, belongs to the latter case. (Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984) 
As mentioned in section 2.1, in a Beveridge system, the health care is nationalised and pro-
vided at governmental hospital for free or at a very low cost (Bhattacharya et al., 2014). The 
demand of healthcare will therefore always excess the supply. Since the price of healthcare is 
below the market-clearing level, the supply must been rationed at the point of use (Lindsay & 
Feigenbaum, 1984). Among those rationing mechanisms in the healthcare sector, rationing by 
waiting list is observed most frequently. (Iversen & Siciliani, 2011)  
3.1.1 The waiting list procedure 
For countries with a national health service, except in emergency situation, patients usually 
cannot refer themselves directly to a surgeon, a referral from their general practitioner (GP) is 
therefore required. When hospital receives GP’s referral, the patient receives time for assess-
ment by a hospital surgeon. During the assessment, the surgeon will investigate if the patient 
meets the threshold for her to being add on the waiting list. If the patient failed to fulfil the re-
quirement, he/she will be referred back to the GP (or to another specialist). If it involves 
emergency, the patient will be proceeded to surgery without delay, otherwise they will be put 
on the hospital waiting list. Patients do not have to pay for joining the queue. At this stage, pa-
tients have also the choice of exit the queue and seek treatment in private care. (Martin & 
Smith, 1999; Siciliani & Hurst, 2005)  
3.1.2  Theories of rationing by waiting list 
According to Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), the rationing power of hospital waiting list lies 
in the “influence of delay on the value of the service delivered” (p. 417). A key assumption in 
their theory is that the value of good or service perceived by a demander diminishes when the 
receipt is delayed. The longer one has to wait in order to obtain a certain good, the lower the 
value of that good is perceived by him. In case of health care, the membership of hospital 
waiting list costs nothing in monetary terms, and the queueing itself does not imply that the 
patient has to wait physically (i.e. no opportunity cost in terms of wasted time). Therefore, the 
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force that brings the demand for and supply of healthcare in equilibrium is the diminishing 
value of health service perceived by the patient due to waiting, rather than increasing cost of 
obtaining such service. 
However, the fact that the membership of hospital waiting list is free does not necessarily im-
ply there are no costs for an individual to join the list. Such cost may be the costs incurred to 
qualify for the waiting list or transaction costs. Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) argued that 
an individual will only join the hospital waiting list if his or her expected benefit from treat-
ment exceed the costs. In the Lindsay-Feigenbaum framework of waiting list rationing, the 
costs are assumed to be constant with respect to waiting time; the expected benefits, as noted 
above, diminish over time and therefore will be discounted by the so-called decay rate. It is 
defined as “the rate at which the effect of treatment deteriorates as the waiting time goes by” 
(Iversen, 1993, p. 67). Furthermore, the decay rate is not merely an economic discounted de-
vice, it also reflects the negative effects associated to the delayed treatment, such as continued 
suffering, loss of earning and reduced QoL (Martin & Smith, 1999). Since both the expected 
benefits and the costs vary across individuals, the theory of Lindsay and Feigenbaum implies, 
waiting discourages demand in a way that patients with relatively low expected gain from the 
treatment are discouraged from joining the waiting list and thus rations the supply. 
The contribution of waiting time on the convergence of demand and supply does not limit on 
the demand side. Empirical evidence has found concerning the positive influence of waiting 
times on the quantity of healthcare supplied. For instance, Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) 
showed that the waiting time is positively related to the cases treated per thousand population 
in British NHS. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is altruism. When waiting 
times are long, healthcare providers may exert greater effort and treat a larger volume of pa-
tients. In countries such as the UK, waiting time has the function of a performance indicator. 
Managers of hospitals may lose their job if the waiting times are too long, which gives them 
incentives to expand the volume of hospital activity in order to bring down waiting times. 
(Iversen & Siciliani, 2011) 
 
3.2 Alternative rationing mechanism  
Since there are some issues of inefficiency (reviewed in section 3.3) regarding to waiting time 
as rationing device, some alternatives rationing mechanism was discussed in previous studies. 
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This section includes a brief presentation of two alternatives to waiting time rationing: thresh-
old rationing and price rationing.  
3.2.1 Threshold rationing 
The threshold rationing is similar to waiting time rationing in the sense that patients with 
highest benefits are prioritised for treatment. It is a type of non-price rationing mechanism un-
der which all patients whose expected benefit are above a certain threshold level receives 
treatment without delay, while patients whose expected benefit are under this level are refused 
for treatment (Gravelle & Siciliani, 2008a; Iversen & Siciliani, 2011). In order to implement 
threshold rationing, it is necessary that the patients benefit from treatment is observable to the 
healthcare provider. In practice, some characteristics of patients, such as age, could reveal in-
formation about their expected benefit and are observable to the providers (Gravelle & 
Siciliani, 2008a). However, if the providers could perfectly observe patients’ expected benefit 
– which is seldom the case in practice – the threshold rationing is more efficient than waiting 
list rationing. The reason is that under threshold rationing, patients with high expected benefit 
do not suffer from the adverse effect associated with waiting, such as reduced utility from 
treatment. (Iversen & Siciliani, 2011)   
3.2.2  Price rationing 
Rationing by price is common in countries where the provision of healthcare is privatised, 
such as Germany, France and the United States. Patients in these countries need to pay the 
healthcare provider in order to receive treatment. Since the treatment may not be affordable to 
everyone, especially those with low income, countries under this system usually provide 
health insurance to its citizen (Bhattacharya et al., 2014). However, in the insurance setting, 
the presence of moral hazard may lead to overconsumption of healthcare2. In order to reduce 
healthcare utilisation, some methods of cost-sharing are used, including co-payment (the in-
sured pays a fixed amount for a given medical service), co-insurance (the insured pays a per-
centage of the total cost) and deductibles (a fixed amount that the insured must pay out-of-
pocket before the coverage is provided) (Chernew & May, 2011). Evidence has been found 
that these “user fees” imposed on patients do have a negative effect on healthcare consump-
tion. The price elasticity of healthcare demand is estimated approximately equal to -0.2 in the 
United States (Manning et al., 2008) and it may varies depending on the co-insurance rate. 
                                                 
2 For instance, if the insured knows that the insurance company will cover all her medical cost, she will then de-
mand all medical care that provides her any positive utility, including expensive procedures which would give 
her little utility but cost the insurer millions. (Bhattacharya et al., 2014) 
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(Zweifel & Manning, 2000). However, several studies, conducted mainly in developing coun-
tries, have founded a positive effect of the introduction of user fees on healthcare utilisation, 
indicating the effect of the unobserved variables that changes simultaneously as the user fee. 
(Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2011) 
 
3.3 The efficiency of different rationing mechanisms 
There are some arguments in favour of waiting time as a rationing mechanism. For instance, 
Iversen (1993) argued that increase in waiting time could decrease health providers’ cost by 
decreasing the probability of idle capacity in the hospital. However, the consensus among 
economists is that waiting time rationing is inefficient. As noted in section 3.1, the patients’ 
(consumers) expected benefit from treatment deteriorates while waiting. This creates a 
deadweight loss to the society because the decreased consumer welfare does not provide any 
gain to the provider in return (Gravelle & Siciliani, 2008b; Lindsay & Feigenbaum, 1984). 
Therefore, waiting time rationing is inferior to price rationing, since the latter generates reve-
nues to the healthcare provider (Iversen & Siciliani, 2011). Furthermore, the administration of 
waiting list requires resources. As noted by Iversen (1993), under the fixed budget, an in-
crease in waiting time would permit capacity utilisation and temporarily increase the number 
of admissions. In the long run, however, the increased delay expands the waiting list and pull 
resources away from medical treatment to administrative tasks related to the waiting list, 
resulting in a decrease in treatment capacity and the number of admissions.   
Regarding the threshold rationing, Gravelle and Siciliani (2008a) showed that it is still supe-
rior to waiting time rationing even if the providers cannot perfectly observe patients’ expected 
benefit, by reason of the loss of those who were rejected from treatment does not outweigh the 
gain of patients with higher expected benefit accrue from immediate treatment. However, de-
spite its efficiency, threshold rationing has not yet been implemented widely in practice. One 
possible explanation is that threshold rationing may generate disutility to the provider. Since 
hospitals are public-funded, patients who are being rejected for treatment might insist their 
right to health care (as taxpayers) and make a formal complaint to the hospital, which causes 
disutility for the hospital personnel (Iversen & Siciliani, 2011). Furthermore, the main idea 
behind nationalised health care is that everyone should be treated equally (Bhattacharya et al., 
2014). The explicit refusal of treatment in threshold rationing might be politically 
controversial since it would violate the solidarity principle the Beveridge model based upon 
(Iversen & Siciliani, 2011).   
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Concerning the price rationing, as we have noted earlier, waiting time rationing are inefficient 
in comparison to this type of rationing. Gravelle and Siciliani (2008b) showed that a neces-
sary condition for positive waiting time to be welfare optimal is the marginal cost of waiting 
is higher for those with small benefit from treatment. This seems unlikely to happen. It is 
more likely that this marginal cost is higher for patients with higher benefit from treatment, 
which is a sufficient condition for price rationing methods to dominate (Iversen & Siciliani, 
2011). Regarding the optimal level of user fee, Felder (2008) concluded that neither no insur-
ance nor full insurance is welfare optimal, the optimal co-insurance rate is a positive value 
smaller than one. He also shows that under certain circumstances, for instance when the 
choice of co-insurance rate is restricted, it might be optimal to maintain a positive waiting 
time. However, if co-insurance rate is set optimally, the optimal waiting time should equal to 
zero.  
Price rationing also faces equity issues similar to threshold rationing. There is empirical evi-
dence of the reduction of healthcare utilisation caused by user fee are stronger among the poor 
than the rich. Poor people are also more responsive to price changes and might postpone nec-
essary treatment due to high user fee (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2011). Therefore, price 
rationing methods might deprive low-income people of valuable care (Bhattacharya et al., 
2014). Many countries (mainly developed economies) tried to mitigate these negative effects 
of user fee by introducing an exemption system. Examples for such arrangement can be grant-
ing reduction for a certain group or relate the maximum amount of user fee to individuals’ 
level of income (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2011). Another way to promote equity is to 
give tax breaks to non-profit hospitals, which deliver charity care to the poor (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2014).  
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4 Methods 
In this section, we describe the methods and econometric framework of our study. Since 
nearly all our outcome variables are binary (except for some cases concerning self-perceived 
life expectancy), we use linear probability model (LPM) when estimating the effect of waiting 
times on health. LPM is one of the most widely-used techniques for estimating equations with 
binary outcomes and this research tactic has been employed by several influential health-re-
lated studies, including the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2012). 
Another argument in favour of LPM is its simplicity in the interpretation of coefficients com-
paring to the alternative methods, such as Logit and Probit (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). How-
ever, we use the Probit regression model as a sensitivity test in order to check the robustness 
of our estimated result. 
  
4.1 Measures of waiting time and research strategy 
The conventional measures of hospital waiting times are (1) waiting time of patient selected 
for treatment and (2) waiting time of patient on the list at a census date. The first one 
measures the period between the date at which the patient is added to the waiting list and the 
date of treatment; The second one measures the time that patients have waited on the list at a 
census date (Iversen & Siciliani, 2011; Siciliani & Hurst, 2005). However, different measures 
of waiting times have been used in the SHARE surveys. In the first wave, there are two con-
tinues variables concerning hospital waiting: Days waiting for emergency consultation to spe-
cialist and Weeks waiting for non-emergency consultation. These variables describe how long 
time the respondent (or more precisely, patients who diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases) 
has to wait for a certain consultation, which he or she had obtained during a twelve-months 
period before the date of interview3. (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005). Unfortunately, however, 
these two variables do not appear in later waves, since questions about hospital wait had not 
been asked after Wave 1. Nevertheless, there is one variable that relates indirectly to waiting 
time in Wave 5 and Wave 6, called UnmetNeedWait, which is a dummy variable that equal to 
one if the respondent has during past twelve months unable to meet a doctor due to too long 
waits. (Börsch-Supan & Malter, 2015; "Questionnaire Wave 5 (English)," 2015) 
                                                 
3 Before the question about waiting time is asked, the respondents must answer a question about whether they 
have contact with a health specialist in past twelve month, if the answer is yes, they were asked to specify 
whether it is an emergency consultation or not. (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005) 
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Given the information SHARE provides, we decided to conduct two regression analyses with 
different explanatory variables for waiting times. In our main analysis, we use the two contin-
uous variables Days waiting for emergency consultation to specialist and Weeks waiting for 
non-emergency consultation in Wave 1 as regressors. Since this specification limits the main 
analysis to data collected in 2004, we conduct an additional complementary analysis using the 
dummy variable UnmetNeedWait in Wave 5 and Wave 6 as explanatory variable in order to 
overcome this limitation.  
We would also like to highlight that the main analysis and the complementary analysis are 
two separate analyses independent of each other. The focus of this study will be on results 
from the main analysis, since the waiting time variables used in this analysis are continuous, 
which provide more information than the binary waiting time variable used in the comple-
mentary analysis. However, we still think that the results from the complementary analysis 
may be valuable since it answers the research question from a different angle. Therefore, our 
advice to the readers is to treat the results from the complementary analysis as a supplement to 
results from the main analysis.  
 
4.2 Main analysis 
4.2.1 Effect of waiting times on self-perceived physical and general health  
We estimate the effect of waiting time on self-perceived physical and general health by esti-
mating the following equation:  
𝐺𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (1)  
Where 𝐺𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable that denotes different self-reported health outcomes for indi-
vidual i living in country j. In our estimation, 𝐺𝑖𝑗 could be respondent’s self-reported gen-
eral health and symptoms related to the cardiovascular diseases, namely, chest pain and 
breathlessness. In SHARE, two different scales had assigned to question about respond-
ents’ self-reported general health (the respondent replied both): the European scale (very 
good, good, fair, bad, very bad) and the US scale (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor), 
respectively. We decide to follow the example of Finkelstein et al. (2012) and construct 
two types of binary outcome variable for each scale:  (1) Good health, a dummy variable 
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equal to one if respondent had replied “excellent”, “very good” and “good”4; and (2) 
Health not poor, a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent does not answer “poor”5 
in the question about general health. As for variables for the symptoms related to cardio-
vascular diseases, both variables are equal to one if the respondent replied “yes” in ques-
tion about whether he or she had suffered from chest pain or breathlessness during a 
twelve-month period before the interview date.  
𝑊𝑖𝑗 is variable for waiting times. In our estimation, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 could be one of the two waiting times 
measures in SHARE we described in section 4.1. The core of this analysis is to estimate 𝛽1, 
which is the coefficient of 𝑊𝑖𝑗 and can be interpret as the effect of waiting times on respond-
ents’ health outcome. We are interested in the sign and the size of 𝛽1. In order to avoid any 
kind of biases in estimation of 𝛽1, we add control variables at individual and country level – 
denoted by 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗6, respectively – into the regression model. The choice of control varia-
bles is based on previous medical and health economic studies related to hospital waiting 
times – more specifically, the studies of Sampalis et al. (2001) and Moscelli et al. (2016). 
However, despite the fact that some control variables can be obtained directly from SHARE 
(e.g. gender and age of the respondents), we have to generate some variables on our own and 
modify some existing variables in order to make the interpretation less complex. The gener-
ated and modified variables are listed as follows: 
• Obesity: a dummy variable equals to one if the respondent’s body mass index is equal 
to or greater than 30. (WHO, 2017) 
• High educated: a dummy variable equals to one if the respondent has an education 
level of 5 or 6 according to UNESCO’s International standard classification of educa-
tion 1997 (ISCED-1997). (UNESCO, 1997)   
• Logarithmised adjusted total household gross income: a continuous variable which is 
the sum of the income of each member of the respondent’s household during 2003. 
                                                 
4 “very good”, “good” in the equivalent European scale. 
5 “bad”, “very bad” in the equivalent European scale 
6 𝐶𝑖 is a set of covariates that are potentially correlated with the health outcome at individual level, such as re-
spondent’s gender, education level, age etc., while 𝐶𝑗 is a single dummy variable equal to one if the respondent 
comes from a Beveridge country (i.e. country with national health service)  
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We follow the example of Siciliani and Verzulli (2009) and adjust the total household 
gross income with purchasing power parity (PPP)7 and the household size8.  
• Beveridge: a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a nationalised health care 
system. In the main analysis, we classify Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and Spain under 
“Beveridge countries”. This classification is based on OECD Country Health Profile 
2017 and Mossialos et al. (2017).  
A full list of control variables is provided in Appendix II.  
4.2.2 Effect of waiting times on self-perceived mental health 
4.2.2a  Estimation using cross-section data (Wave 1) 
We estimate the effect of waiting time on self-perceived mental health by estimating the fol-
lowing equation:  
𝑀𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2a)  
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable that denotes different self-reported mental health for indi-
vidual i living in country j. For example, 𝑀𝑖𝑗 could be an indicator variable for depression, 
which equals to one if the respondent answered that he or she felt sad or depressed in the 
one-month period before the interview date. Other than Depression, 𝑀𝑖𝑗 could also be one 
of the following mental health outcomes: 
• Suicidal feeling 
• Fatigue  
• Irritability 
• Appetite9 
• Insomnia10 
• Concentration on entertainment 
• Concentration on reading 
                                                 
7 This adjustment is achieved by multiplying the value of income (in term of euro) by the ratio of exchange rate 
used in Wave 1 and PPP-adjusted exchange rate in 2004. After the adjustment, the total household gross income 
is denominated in price level in Germany 2005. (SHARE, 2018) 
8 This adjustment is achieved by dividing the PPP-adjusted income value by the square root of the number of 
household member. (Siciliani & Verzulli, 2009) 
9 The respondents were asked whether their desire for food had diminished.  
10 The respondents were asked whether they have experienced sleeping problems 
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The definition of 𝑊𝑖𝑗, 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗 are identical to equation (1). Besides, although we run a 
number of regression with different mental health outcomes, the set of control variables is 
nearly the same across these regressions. The only exception is the model with Depression 
as dependent variable, where we added an extra control, Depression ever, which equals to 
one if the respondent has suffered from symptoms of depression previously, into the re-
gression. 
4.2.2b Estimation using panel data (Wave 1 + Wave 2) 
In order to investigate whether hospital waits in a certain point of time have effect on the 
mental health outcome in future period, we extend our analysis using panel data and estimate 
the following equation: 
𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑤2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗,𝑤1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑤1 + 𝐶𝑖,𝑤2 + 𝐶𝑗,𝑤2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (2b)  
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑤2 is a binary variable that denotes different self-reported mental health outcomes 
in Wave 2 for individual i living in country j. Since the second wave of SHARE was con-
ducted in 2006/2007 (SHARE, 2018a)11, 𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑤2 can also be roughly interprets as the mental 
health outcomes of the patients four years after he or she had experienced hospital wait (ex-
cept for Israel). 𝑊𝑖𝑗,𝑤1 denotes the waits that individual i living in country j had experienced 
in year 2003 (Wave 1) and similar to the cross-section variant, we are interested in the size 
and the sign of its coefficient, 𝛽1. 𝐶𝑖,𝑤2 and 𝐶𝑗,𝑤2 are control variables at individual level and 
country level obtained from Wave 2. A major difference between the panel data analysis and 
the cross-sectional one is that we include respondent’s mental health outcomes from Wave 1, 
𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑤1, into the model, since it is reasonable to assume that the mental health outcomes in 
Wave 2 might correlate with the outcome in previous period and falling to control that might 
leads to biased estimation.   
4.2.3 Effect of waiting times on self-perceived life expectancy 
In SHARE, the question that relates to the respondents’ self-perceived life expectancy is: 
“What are the chances that you will live to be age XXX or more?”, where the target age as-
signed to each respondent varies, depending on the age of the respondent by the time of inter-
                                                 
11 Data collection in Israel was conducted in 2009/2010  
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view. Furthermore, instead of expressing age in numerical value, SHARE had divided the re-
spondents into age intervals. These age intervals and their respective target age are listed as 
the following (SHARE, 2018a): 
Table 1  
Age intervals and target age in question about life expectancy 
Respondents’ age Target age in question about life expec-
tancy 
age < 65 75 
age > 64 and age < 70 80 
age > 69 and age < 75 85 
age > 74 and age < 80 90 
age > 79 and age < 85 95 
age > 84 and age < 95 100 
age > 94 and age < 100 105 
age > 99 and age < 105 110 
age > 104 120 
 
As table 1 shows, for those respondents with an age ≤ 90, we can interpret the outcome varia-
ble Life expectancy as their “probability12 of living after ten years”, since the difference be-
tween the respondent’ age at the time of interview and the target age assigned to him in the 
question is at least 10. 
 Another issue we have noticed is that our outcome variable does not follow normal distribu-
tion. As Figure 1 shows, many respondents have rated their chances of living after ten years 
equal to 0 and 1, leading to a huge number of observations were allocated to both “tails”.  A 
possible solution for this kind of problem is to exclude these observations. However, we have 
reason to believe that these observations contain information that are valuable to our analysis. 
It is a part of our interest in investigating whether waiting times contribute to the occurrence 
of such “tail behaviours” (i.e. to state that their own chances of living after ten years equals to 
0 or 1). Therefore, we decided to construct two binary outcome variables: (1) 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗, which 
equals to one if the respondent’s Life expectancy equals to 0; and (2) 𝑙1,𝑖𝑗, which equal to one 
                                                 
12 The respondents were asked to rate their chances of living until a certain age in a scale between 0 to 100, 
where 0 implies “absolutely no chance” and 100 implies “absolutely certain”. We transformed the outcomes into 
percentage by dividing it by 100.   
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if the respondent’s Life expectancy equals to 1. We will also estimate the effect of waiting 
times on the original outcome, 𝐿𝑖𝑗, and the adjusted outcome (i.e. those respondents who an-
swered 0 or 1 are excluded), 𝑙𝑖𝑗.  
 
Thus, we estimate the effect of waiting time on self-perceived life expectancy by estimating 
the following four equations:  
𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (3) 
𝑙𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (4) 
𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (5)  
𝑙0,𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (6)  
Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that the control variables for age in these four speci-
fications slightly differs from previous equations. We replace the continuous variables age 
with five dummies corresponding to the age intervals set by SHARE13. The reason for this 
adjustment is that using the continuous variable for respondents’ age might cause our inter-
pretation of the outcome variable as “probability of living after ten years” to be incorrect, 
since this interpretation, as we mentioned above, is based upon age intervals rather than re-
spondents’ actual age.  
                                                 
13 These five dummies are: age65_69, age70_74, age75_79, age80_84 and age85_90. Respondents who are 
younger than 65 is the reference group.  
Figure 1  
Distribution of variable "life expectancy" 
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4.3 Complementary analysis 
As mentioned above, the complementary analysis is based on data collected from 2013 (Wave 
5) and 2015 (Wave 6). We estimate the effect of long hospital wait by estimating following 
equation: 
𝐻𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝑉𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑗) + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗        (7)  
Where 𝐻𝑖𝑗 is the outcome variable that corresponds to all outcome variables we mentioned in 
the main analysis, i.e. 𝐺𝑖𝑗, 𝑀𝑖𝑗, 𝐿𝑖𝑗, 𝑙𝑖𝑗, 𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 and 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗. The variable of interest is 𝑉𝑖𝑗, which is a 
binary variable equal to one if respondent i in country j has during a twelve-months period be-
fore the interview date unable to meet a doctor due to too long waits14; 𝐾𝑖𝑗 is another binary 
variable that equals to one if the respondent has to give up a certain treatment due to high 
cost; and 𝑉𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑗 is the interaction term. As mentioned in section 3.3, high user fee might 
cause low income people to postpone necessary treatment and it is reasonable to think that 
such action might adversely affect the health outcomes of these people. Thus, in order to ob-
tain an unbiased result, we include 𝐾𝑖𝑗 into the model as control variable. In addition, we also 
control for the interaction term 𝑉𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑗, since it is not unlikely that high user fee and long 
hospital wait occur simultaneously.   
𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗 in the complementary analysis is similar to the main analysis. However, the control 
variable Beveridge changes slightly due to more countries are added into the SHARE survey. 
After Portugal joined the Wave 6, there are now five Beveridge countries in the variable Bev-
eridge.  
 
 
   
                                                 
14 Unfortunately, the form of wait (e.g. physical wait in the hospital or waiting list) is not specified in the 
SHARE survey. Furthermore, the definition of “long wait” is far from clear. 
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5 Data 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a cross-national panel 
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family networks of in-
dividuals aged 50 and/or older (SHARE, 2016). The main aim of SHARE is ”understanding 
ageing and how it affects individuals in the diverse cultural settings of Europe” (Börsch-
Supan et al., 2005, p. 5). According to the official methodology volume, SHARE data was 
collected using computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), an interviewing technique 
where an interviewer conducts face-to-face interviews using digitalised survey questionnaire 
installed on a laptop. (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005). 
Regarding the design of the survey, SHARE consists of various thematic blocks or modules, 
ranging from demographic information to respondents’ expectation about the future. The ma-
jority of variables used in this study are obtained from the following four questionnaire mod-
ules (SHARE, 2018a):  
• Physical Health (PH): consists information regarding self-reported general health, 
longstanding illness or disability.  
• Mental Health (MH): consists information regarding the respondents’ mental and 
emotional health.  
• Health Care (HC): consists information related to health care, such as recent doctor 
visits, hospital stays, and health insurance. The variables of waiting times are provided 
in this module.  
• Expectations (EX): consists information about respondent’s expectations, such as the 
level of certainty they feel about the future.  
To date, SHARE has collected and released six waves of data (Wave 1-6). Data has been col-
lected from more than 297 000 interviews with over 120 000 respondents (SHARE, 2016). 
Wave 1, the first wave, was collected in 2004 and contain data from twelve countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Swe-
den, and Israel. Since then, the number of countries included have increased. In Wave 6, the 
last released wave of data, 18 countries were included. Of the original twelve, only the Neth-
erlands is absent. The other seven countries that participated in SHARE Wave 6 are Czech 
Republic, Poland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Estonia, and Croatia (SHARE, 2018c). 
Our analyses in this study are based on data from Wave 1,2,5 and 6. The reason why we ex-
cluded Wave 3 and Wave 4 is the absence of variable for hospital waiting times in these 
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waves (SHARE, n.d). The design of the third wave, SHARELIFE, is also completely different 
from other waves since it focuses in particular on respondents’ life histories. (SHARE, 2018b) 
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6 Results 
6.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2a in Appendix II provides the descriptive statistics for our main analysis. On average, 
the waiting times for non-emergency consultation are approximately 3.85 weeks. In the case 
of emergency consultations, the mean waiting time for a patient to received treatment is ap-
proximately 5.47 days. 3730 patients who diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases are in-
cluded in the original sample from SHARE, 1582 of them are dropped in the process of con-
structing control variables15, resulting a sample that consists 2148 respondents16. The average 
age of these respondents is 69 years and approximately 57% of them are male. Additionally, 
only 12% of the respondents have attended college/university and the reported household in-
comes after adjustment of household size are EUR 763.57 per annum on average, in terms of 
the price level in Germany 2005.  
The summary statistics for the complementary analysis are provided in Table 2b and 2c in 
Appendix II. Since more country has been added to the SHARE survey, the sample sizes of 
complementary analysis are also larger than the main analysis. The mean age of respondents 
is 71.17 years (Wave 5) and 72.08 years (Wave 6), respectively. Regarding the waiting times, 
around 10.8% (Wave 5) and 15% (Wave 6) of the respondents could not see a doctor due to 
too long waits. The percentage of respondents who are prevented from treatment due to high 
costs are approximately 7% for both waves, which might indicate that the problem of exces-
sive hospital waiting times is more common than the problem of high hospital user fee among 
OECD countries.  
6.2 Self-perceived physical and general health 
Table 3 and 4 in Appendix III provides results for the main analysis, with self-perceived phys-
ical and general health as the outcome variables, as in equation (1). In Table 3, we use Weeks 
waiting for non-emergency consultation (hereinafter non-emergency waits) as a measurement 
of waiting times, while in Table 4, the variable will be Days waiting for emergency consulta-
tion to specialist (hereinafter emergency waits).  
                                                 
15 Respondents who did not answered questions about their general health, mental health and life expectancy are 
excluded, as well as those who refuses to reply in the income questions.  
16 The number of observations in our regressions is, however, much smaller than 2148. This is mainly due to 
missing values in the two variables of waiting times. Only 214 respondents had answered the question about 
non-emergency waits and 159 respondents the question about emergency waits.  
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Results from Table 3 show that in general, non-emergency waits do not adversely affect the 
self-perceived physical and general health outcome of patients with cardiovascular diseases. 
A majority of our estimates for waiting times’ effect are also statistically insignificant, with 
some exceptions in column (5), (6) and (7), where the outcome variables are generated from 
the US-version of health general questions. The results showed in these columns are counter-
intuitive, since they imply that waiting times have a positive effect on patients self-perceived 
health outcome. For instance, the result in column (6) can be interpreted as “an increase of 
one week in non-emergency waits increases the probability of a patient reporting his or her 
own health as “excellent”, “very good” or “good” (hereinafter probability of good health) 
with 1.48%.” The reason for this positive effect is unclear. However, we do suspect that it 
might be a result of failing to control for patients’ severity since it is reasonable to think that 
patients who are seriously ill are prioritised to treatment, while the relatively “healthier” pa-
tients often have to wait longer17.  
Among the control variables, the coefficient of Forgo treatment due to costs are statistically 
significant and negatively associated to the probability of good health in column (6), indicat-
ing that high hospital user fees might impose damage on the patients’ self-perceived health. 
The probability of good health for those patients who must abandon the treatment due to the 
costs is about 22% lesser compared with those who did not. It is also clear that the total 
amount of income in the patients’ household is positively associated with their health out-
comes, especially in the probability of a patient not reporting his or her own health as “poor” 
(hereinafter probability of not-poor health). The country-specific control variable Beveridge is 
generally insignificant across different regressions, indicating that there are no differences in 
the general health outcomes between patients in Beveridge countries and in countries with 
other types of healthcare systems. This finding might indicate that non-emergency waits have 
little or no effect on the self-perceived physical and general health.18   
In the case of emergency, as results from Table 4 show, the probability of good health tends to 
decrease when the waits for emergency care become longer. The coefficient of emergency 
waits is statistically significant when the US-scale of good health is used, and weakly signifi-
cant at 10% level when the EU-scale is used. In our estimations, an extra day of waiting for 
                                                 
17 This suspicion has been confirmed by Prof. Kristian Bolin during a supervisor meeting at 22 May.   
18 In the preparatory phase of the main analysis, we run bivariate regressions in order to investigate whether waiting times 
differs significantly between countries in our samples. We find significant differences in non-emergency waits (but not emer-
gency waits) and patients in Beveridge countries have to wait about 4.3 weeks more than patient in countries with other types 
of healthcare system.  
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emergency care reduces the probability of good health with about 0.53% and 0.38%, respec-
tively. The emergency waits are also negatively associated with the probability of not-poor 
health (in both scale) and the probability of suffering from chest pain and breathlessness, but 
none of these coefficients are statistically significant. 
6.3 Self-perceived mental health 
The results of waiting time’s effect on the self-perceived mental health of patients with cardi-
ovascular diseases are provided in Tables 5a–6d in Appendix III. Results from regressions us-
ing non-emergency waits as explanatory variable are showed in Tables 5a–d and in Tables 
6a–d, results concerning the emergency waits are provided.  
In Tables 5a and 5b, we find that non-emergency waits are positively associated with the 
probabilities of having suicidal feelings, appetite problems and problems in concentration on 
entertainment. For mental health outcomes like depression, fatigue, irritability, sleeping disor-
ders, problems in concentration on reading, the associations are negative. However, none of 
these are statistically significant, which implies that the non-emergency waits do not have any 
short-run effect on mental health. As for the long-run, the results from the panel-data analysis 
in Table 5c and 5d show that non-emergency waits generally do not have statistically signifi-
cant effects on future mental outcomes. The only exception is depression: a one-week in-
crease of non-emergency waits increases a patient’s probability of suffering from depression 
by 0.787%. 
Similar to the results from self-perceived general health, we also find evidence of the adverse 
effect of high hospital user fee on mental health. The coefficient of Forgo treatment due to 
costs is positive and statistically significant in column (8) in Table 5a, which implies that pa-
tients who have to abandon treatment due to high costs are more likely to be irritated compare 
with those who do not.  
In contrast to non-emergency waits, results from Table 6a and 6b show that emergency waits 
have positive and statistically significant associations with several types of deterioration in 
mental health, including depression, fatigue (marginally significant at 10% level), irritability 
and sleeping disorders. As waiting times for emergency care increase by one day, the proba-
bilities of suffering from these negative mental outcomes will increase by 0.504% (depres-
sion), 0.524% (fatigue), 0.869% (irritability) and 0.716% (sleeping disorders), respectively. 
These are clear evidence of the adverse effect of hospital waiting times on patients’ health in 
the short-run, even though their sizes are relatively small compared to some control variables, 
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such as variable for gender, whose estimated effect on mental outcomes are much larger 
(around 27 % – 30 %). As for the long-run, we only find one statistically significant effect of 
emergency waits on fatigue. Interestingly, compared with its cross-sectional variant, the sig-
nificance of the coefficient of emergency waits slightly improves in the panel-data analysis, 
but the size of the coefficient is virtually unchanged. As for the rest of the mental health out-
comes, the effect of emergency waits is insignificant. 
6.4  Self-perceived life expectancy  
The results of waiting time’s effect on the self-perceived life expectancy of patients with car-
diovascular diseases are provided in Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix III. Table 7 shows the results 
using non-emergency waits as explanatory variable and in Table 8 the emergency waits.  
In Table 7, we find no adverse effect of non-emergency waits on the patients’ self-perceived 
life expectancy. On the contrary, the signs of the coefficients show positive associations be-
tween non-emergency waits and health, although most of them are not statistically significant. 
The only exception is the bivariate regression in column (3) that uses the adjusted life expec-
tancy as the outcome variable, where patients who rated their probability of living after ten 
years equal to 0% and 100% are excluded. The coefficient for non-emergency waits in this re-
gression is statistically significant and indicates that for those patients who did not answer 
“absolutely no chance” or “absolutely certain” in the life expectancy question, a one-week in-
crease in non-emergency waits will lead to an approximately 0.8% decrease in their probabil-
ity of living after ten years. Nevertheless, this coefficient becomes insignificant when we 
added control variables into the model. Additionally, results from Table 7 also show that ra-
ther than waiting times, the self-perceived life expectancy is appearing to be depended on pa-
tients’ age, since many of the age interval dummies are moderately significant at 1% level and 
at 5% level. We also find that high hospital user fees have significant negative effects on 
health even when the outcomes are now measured in life expectancy.  
Nevertheless, the situations in emergency waits are, as we expected, different from the non-
emergency cases. Among the regressions in Table 8, only column (2) is statistically signifi-
cant and it shows that emergency waits are negatively associated with the self-perceived life 
expectancy. The coefficient of emergency waits is also highly significant at 1% level, which 
implies that a one-day increase in emergency waits decreases the patient’s probability of liv-
ing after ten years by approximately 0.45%. It should be noticed that the outcome variable in 
column (2) is not normally distributed, which might lead to inaccuracy in the significance 
tests since our sample size is not reasonably large (Field, 2009).  
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6.5 Results from the complementary analysis 
As mention in section 4.1, we conduct a complementary analysis in order to overcome the 
limitations of data in the main analysis. Just as the name implies, the complementary analysis 
is designed to complement the main analysis with more recent data, rather than to replace it. 
In the complementary analysis, the explanatory variable of waiting time is UnmetNeedWait 
(recoded as Long wait in our analysis for explanation purpose), which is a binary outcome 
variable that equals to one if the patient could not meet a doctor due to too long waits. In our 
estimations, we interpret the coefficient of this variable as the effect of excessive19 waits on 
different self-perceived health measures.    
6.5.1 General health 
The effects of excessive waits on the self-perceived general health of patient with cardiovas-
cular diseases are provided in Tables 9 in Appendix IV. It shows that patients who experi-
enced excessive waits have generally lower self-perceived general health than patients with-
out such experience. The coefficients for Long wait are statistically significant across all re-
gressions. However, even though the estimated effects of excessive waits are statistical signif-
icant and have identical signs in both waves, there is still differences in the effect size, espe-
cially when the health outcome is measured as probability of good health: in Wave 5, the 
probability of good health reduces by approximately 23% if the patient has experienced ex-
cessive waits; in Wave 6, however, the size of this reduction is approximately 12%. Com-
pared to results obtained from Wave 5, the estimated effect of excessive wait using data from 
Wave 6 are generally smaller. Additionally, the differences in effect size also exists between 
outcome measures, the estimated effect of excessive wait on the probability of good health are 
generally larger than on the probability of not-poor health.  
Similar to the main analysis, we find significant adverse effects of high user fee on the pa-
tients’ general health outcome using data from Wave 5. Other control variables that have 
statistically significant effects on the general health are household income (positive associa-
tion), education (positive association) and obesity (only in Wave 5, negative association). The 
coefficient of country-level control Beveridge is generally insignificant, a result similar to our 
finding in the main analysis.  
                                                 
19 We also assume that the type of wait in the survey question is non-emergency waits. 
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6.5.2 Mental health 
The effects of excessive waits on the self-perceived mental health of patients with cardiovas-
cular diseases are provided in Tables 10a-11b in Appendix IV. Surprisingly, we find that ex-
cessive waits are positively associated with every type of deteriorations in mental health in 
both waves. For Wave 5, the estimated effects of excessive waits are statistically significant in 
every single regression (marginally significant in appetite), even after control variables are in-
cluded. As Tables 10a and 10b show, excessive waits have largest effect on fatigue (the prob-
ability of feeling tired are about 21.29 % higher for patients who has experienced excessive 
waits), followed by irritability (19.2%), depression (14.83%) and sleep disorders (14.61%); 
For Wave 6, the estimated effect have shown statistically significant effect on half of the men-
tal health outcomes, including depression (marginally significant), suicidal feeling, sleep dis-
orders and concentration on entertainment (marginally significant). Similar to the general 
health, the estimated effect sizes of excessive waits in Wave 6 are generally lower compared 
to estimations in Wave 5, except for sleeping disorder.  
As for control variables, the coefficients for high user fee generally have a positive sign, but 
its statistical significance differs across waves. The education level is negatively associated 
with the deterioration in mental health, and in some cases, its effects are highly significant at a 
1% level.  
6.5.3 Life expectancy 
The result of excessive waits’ effect on the self-perceived life expectancy of patients with car-
diovascular diseases are reported in Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix IV. We find that excessive 
waits are not associated with patients’ probability of living after ten years. This finding is con-
sistent with our result in section 6.4, that the non-emergency waits do not adversely affect pa-
tients’ self-perceived life expectancy. Furthermore, Table 12 and 13 also suggest that the 
changes in probabilities of living after ten years are mainly driven by patients’ age, a result 
similar to what we obtained from the main analysis.  
Interestingly, both Table 12 and 13 suggest that patients from Beveridge countries have 
higher probabilities of living after ten years (or less likely to answer “absolutely no chance” in 
life expectancy question). The coefficients for the country level control are also highly signifi-
cant in Wave 6, which contradicts our finding in the main analysis. One possible explanation 
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is that more nations, in particular, Eastern European countries20, are included in Wave 6, 
which causes changes in the definition of variable Beveridge. According to Country Health 
Profiles 2017, the health spending per capita in these countries are all below the EU average 
(OECD, 2017a). In the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia, the life expectancy at age 65 are 
also noticeably lower than the OECD average, which is not a surprise since health expendi-
tures are often positively associated with life expectancy (OECD, 2017). We suspect that 
health expenditures also affect the self-perceived life expectancy, and the inclusion of coun-
tries with lower health spending per capita might have caused the self-perceived life expec-
tancy in non-Beveridge countries to fall relative to Beveridge countries.  
 
                                                 
20 i.e. Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, Estonia and Slovenia. These countries are also classified as non-Beve-
ridge countries since they apply a Bismarck system. 
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7 Sensitivity analysis  
In order to see whether our estimation of waiting times’ effects is sensitive to changes in 
model specifications and in control variables, we re-estimate all equations in the main analy-
sis using the Probit model and doing several alterations in the definition of following control 
variables: 
1. Household income. One possible source of imprecision is the choice of using the 
logarimised household income, which leads to people who have zero income are ex-
cluded from the sample. We therefore replace it with the PPP-adjusted household in-
come expressed in thousand euros.  
2. Education. The control variable for education in our model, high educated, is a varia-
ble with categorical outcomes. It is therefore reasonable to replace it with years of 
education since it is a continuous variable and provides more information than the 
categorical one. However, we still think that the choice of high educated as a proxy of 
the respondents’ education level is superior in our case, especially when we are using 
a cross-national sample. We can expect that diversity exists in the educational systems 
across countries, which makes the years of education incomparable. Furthermore, 
longer school years does not necessarily mean that the respondent has higher educa-
tion level.  
3. Obesity. Using the same logic in the case of the education variable, we replace the bi-
nary control variable Obesity with its continuous alternative BMI.  
4. Beveridge. We also re-defined the country-specific control variable, considering the 
dividing line between Beveridge countries and non-Beveridge countries might be un-
clear. There is some degree of convergence in health policy in the developed world, 
many Beveridge nations have experimented to introduce some elements from the Bis-
marck model in order to overcome the disadvantages of a nationalised health care, and 
the Bismarck countries do the same as well (Bhattacharya et al., 2014). Therefore, we 
alter the definition of variable Beveridge from “equal to one if the country has a 
nationalised healthcare system” to “equal to one if the country has reported waiting-
time problem for public patients”. According to Siciliani and Hurst (2005), following 
countries (that participated in SHARE survey) falls into this definition: Sweden, Den-
mark, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain. 
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The results of sensitivity analysis are provided in Table 14 in Appendix V. It shows that the 
re-estimated effects of waiting times are, in general, similar to the results before alterations 
are made, in both the sign and the size of the coefficients. We can therefore conclude that our 
estimations have passed the robustness check.  
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8 Discussion 
8.1 Policy implications 
The result from both the main analysis and the complementary analysis show that waiting 
times do have adverse effects on several self-perceived health outcomes, especially when the 
waiting times is excessive and when emergency situations are involved. The waiting times for 
non-emergency consultations are in general not negatively associated with patients’ health. 
Thus, our results imply that one of the primary objectives for one country’s health policy is to 
prevent excessive (non-emergency) wait and to reduce days of waiting in emergency consul-
tation. Since there are no significant differences between Beveridge countries and non-Beve-
ridge countries, this policy implication is applicable regardless what type of healthcare sys-
tems one country has. In the following paragraph, we will discuss some of the policy inter-
ventions to reduce waiting times. However, it is reasonable to think that the political instru-
ments for achieving the above-mentioned objective in a country with nationalised health care 
might be different from a country where the provision of healthcare is privatised. For the pur-
pose of simplicity, we only discuss policies conducted under a Beveridge system, since long 
waiting times are more common and have become a serious political issue in Beveridge coun-
tries.  
Siciliani and Hurst (2005) compiled different health policies in twelve OECD countries that 
were used to tackle excessive waiting times. They show that excessive waits can be reduced 
by policies that target on the supply side (e.g. increase productivity by funding extra activi-
ties, improving waiting list management, promote private sector) and the demand side (e.g. 
raising clinical thresholds using score system) of the healthcare market, or acting on the wait-
ing times directly (e.g. maximum waiting-time guarantee). However, they also argued that if 
the hospital budget is fixed, policies that temporarily adding resources in order to create extra 
activity will have little success, due to the dynamic nature of waiting time. In their opinion, a 
supply-side policy that rewards hospitals with high productivity using a dynamic budget (so-
called activity-based payment) is therefore more preferable.  
As for emergency waits, a great amount of published articles investigates the phenomenon 
emergency department crowding, where waiting times are measured in minutes or hours in-
stead of days (Andersson & Karlberg, 2001; Hoot & Aronsky, 2008). In order to reduce this 
type of wait, policies such as increasing resources (e.g. hospital personnel, beds, medical ob-
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servation units) and demand management (e.g. triage) are suggested and have shown to be ef-
fective (Hoot & Aronsky, 2008). Although waiting times that arise due to crowding in 
hospitals’ emergency department is not the same as the emergency waits in this study, we see 
no problems of adopting the above-mentioned policies into our case, namely days waiting for 
emergency consultation to specialist, or at least using the logic behind to develop policies 
suitable to this type of emergency waits.   
However, as mentioned in section 3.3, rationing health care by waiting list is not welfare opti-
mal. Relative to other rationing mechanisms, waiting list rationing is less efficient. Combin-
ing with our result about excessive and emergency waits’ adverse effects on health, a pro-
posal of completely abandon waiting list rationing and adopting some of the alternative ra-
tioning mechanisms should be considered. Nevertheless, our results also show that high hos-
pital user fee may also contribute deteriorations of several health outcomes. In order to de-
velop an optimal size of user fee, more detailed and comprehensive research on alternative 
rationing mechanisms is therefore required. 
8.2 Comparison with previous studies  
Even though our results partially support the previous findings of Sampalis et al. (2001) and 
Jónsdóttir and Baldursdóttir (1998), there are still considerable differences between our study 
and theirs, which made them not directly comparable to each other.  
The most important difference is the research focus. The works of Sampalis et al. (2001) and 
Jónsdóttir and Baldursdóttir (1998) both focuses on the preoperative wait and includes only 
patients who are awaiting CABG surgery in the sample, while in this study, our sample con-
sists patients who diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases and had experienced waits over the 
last twelve months by the time of interview before receiving his or her (inpatient) treatment. 
The type of treatment at which the patients are waiting for is, however, not specified in our 
study. This is a caveat that readers should bear in mind when interpreting our results for the 
simple reason that patients who diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases do not necessarily 
seek treatments in cardiovascular care. Hence, all waiting times variables used in this study 
do not only measure the waiting times for treatment in cardiovascular care but also other 
types of treatment as well.  
In fact, there are variables in the SHARE survey that could help us to distinguish different 
types of treatment from one and another, where following inpatient treatments in cardiovas-
38 
 
cular care are included: insertion, replacement and removal of pacemaker, CABG, and car-
diac catheterisation. However, these variables have serious problems of missing values, 
which is also the reason why we choose to exclude them from our models.     
Other than the difference in research focus, there are some minor differences in choice of var-
iables. For instance, Jónsdóttir and Baldursdóttir (1998) included health-related habits in their 
study, and Sampalis et al. (2001) had vitality as one of their QoL measurements. Both these 
variables are absent in our study. There are also differences in methods: the study of 
Jónsdóttir and Baldursdóttir (1998) has more of a descriptive nature and concentrates on de-
scribing what are the negative effect of prolonged waiting times on patients self-perceived 
health; Sampalis et al. (2001) employed a sample with two groups when they investigated the 
effect waiting times on patients QoL. Both approaches share little similarity with methods 
used in our study.  
 
8.3 Methodological limitations  
Other than the limitation of old data, which we already have mentioned, there are several 
drawbacks in our methods, which might cause our estimates of waiting times’ effect to devi-
ate from its true value. We need to highlight the possible omitted variable bias in our estima-
tions. For instance, we have not included control variable for severity in our model since 
there are no such variables in the SHARE survey that are suitable for our analyses. This, in 
our opinion, might be the reason for the counter-intuitive results shown in section 6.2. The 
difference in estimations between Wave 5 and Wave 6 might also be a consequence of unob-
served components, such as policy change. Furthermore, the results from general health ques-
tion might suffer from biases due to differences in language and culture between countries. 
The waiting time measures in this study could also be problematic since they are defined dif-
ferently from the conventional measures. A direct consequence of this difference in definition 
is the decreased comparability of our results with other research concerning waiting times.   
We also want to remind the reader about the fact that, in addition to the methods used in this 
study, there are other possible approaches in investigating the effect of waiting times on 
health outcomes. For instance, we could have done a panel data analysis that examines 
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whether waiting times at Wave 1 affects health outcomes in later waves21, instead of doing 
two independent cross-section analyses with waiting time data collected in three different ob-
servation time point. However, this approach would be difficult to implement due to loss of 
observations. As mentioned in 6.1, the mean age of our sample population in Wave 1 is 69 
years. Since there are 14 years between Wave 1 and Wave 6, the sample size is likely to di-
minish over time by reason of, for example, death.  
 
8.4 Extrapolation to other contexts 
As for the validity of our result, we have already discussed one interpretation issue in section 
8.2. However, there are more caveats the readers should bear in mind: Firstly, our findings 
only speak to the self-perceived health outcomes of patients with cardiovascular diseases in 
OECD countries at a certain point of time. That means our result may not be applicable to pa-
tients with other types of illness or patients in developing countries; Secondly, the use of the 
results from complementary analysis should be done in a prudent manner. Even though it has 
a larger sample size and shows more statistically significant results, it is still less informative 
than the main analysis, subjected to the vague definition of the waiting time variable. Our in-
terpretation of the coefficient of variable UnmetNeedWait as the effect of excessive waits is 
only one of many possible interpretations.  
Nevertheless, the result from sensitivity analysis shows that our estimations are robust for 
changes in model specification and in control variables.  
  
                                                 
21 By using health outcomes in Wave 1,2,4,5 and 6 as dependent variable and waiting time measurements in 
Wave 1 as explanatory variable.  
40 
 
9 Conclusion 
Using a cross-national sample, we investigate the effect of hospital waiting times on the self-
perceived health outcomes of patients with cardiovascular diseases in OECD countries. For 
the self-perceived physical and general health outcome, we found generally no evidence of 
adverse effects of non-emergency waits. However, we do find evidence of emergency waits 
and excessive wait affects general health outcome negatively. For the self-perceived mental 
health, we found generally no negative association between non-emergency waits and the 
mental health outcome in the same period. However, the increase of emergency waits may 
induce an increase in the probability of suffering from depression, irritability, and sleeping 
disorders at the conventional significance level (5%). Excessive waits are positively associ-
ated with nearly all types of deterioration in mental health. When we extend our analysis to 
the long-run mental health effects, we find evidence of an increase in the probability of suf-
fering from depression is associated with an increase in non-emergency waits; and an in-
crease in the probability of suffering from fatigue is associated with an increase in emergency 
waits. For the self-perceived life expectancy, we find that only emergency waits have ad-
versely impact on patients’ probability of living after ten years.  
Our results would seem to suggest that the health policy should be designed to bring down 
emergency waits and excessive waits. However, giving the efficiency concerns of waiting 
times as rationing mechanism, alternative rationing methods such as threshold rationing and 
price rationing (i.e. co-payment, co-insurance, and deductibles) should also be considered as 
a potential replacement of waiting time rationing. Detailed research on the alternative ration-
ing methods, especially in determining the welfare optimal size of hospital user fee is there-
fore required.  
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Appendix 
Appendix I: Data source 
 
This thesis uses data from SHARE Waves 1, 2, 5 and 6 (DOIs: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.610, 
10.6103/SHARE.w2.610, 10.6103/SHARE.w5.610, 10.6103/SHARE.w6.610), see Börsch-
Supan et al. (2013) for methodological details.  
The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through 
FP5 (QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-
CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: 
N°211909, SHARE-LEAP: N°227822, SHARE M4: N°261982). Additional funding from the 
German Ministry of Education and Research, the Max Planck Society for the Advancement 
of Science, the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-13S2, P01_AG005842, 
P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG_BSR06-11, 
OGHA_04-064, HHSN271201300071C) and from various national funding sources is grate-
fully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org).   
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Appendix II: Descriptive statistics 
Table 2a 
Descriptive statistics for Main analysis     
  Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome variables     
Good health (EU-scale) 0.2767 0.4475 0 1 
Good health (US-scale) 0.3881 0.4874 0 1 
Health not poor (EU-scale) 0.7354 0.4412 0 1 
Health not poor (US-scale) 0.7968 0.4025 0 1 
Chest pain 0.4209 0.4938 0 1 
Breathlessness 0.2961 0.4566 0 1 
Depression 0.4527 0.4979 0 1 
Depression (Wave 2) 0.4175 0.4933 0 1 
Suicidal feeling 0.1391 0.3462 0 1 
Suicidal feeling (Wave 2) 0.1152 0.3194 0 1 
Fatigue 0.4494 0.4976 0 1 
Fatigue (Wave 2) 0.4636 0.4989 0 1 
Irritability 0.2871 0.4525 0 1 
Irritability (Wave 2) 0.2920 0.4549 0 1 
Appetite 0.1346 0.3414 0 1 
Appetite (Wave 2) 0.1445 0.3518 0 1 
Insomnia 0.4001 0.4900 0 1 
Insomnia (Wave 2) 0.4004 0.4902 0 1 
Concentration on entertainment 0.1875 0.3904 0 1 
Concentration on entertainment (Wave 2)  0.1986 0.3991 0 1 
Concentration on reading 0.2346 0.4239 0 1 
Concentration on reading (Wave 2) 0.2364  0.4250 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years 0.4885 0.3091 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years (adjusted) 0.4878 0.2354 0.01 0.99 
Probability of living after ten years = 0 0.1044 0.3059 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years = 1 0.1007 0.3011 0 1 
     
Explanatory variables     
Non-emergency waiting times (weeks) 3.8458 6.3030 0 40 
Emergency waiting times (days) 5.4654 12.3492 0 98 
Male 0.5717 0.4950 0 1 
High educated 0.1283 0.3345 0 1 
ln(total household income) 6.6380 1.7622 0.8292 12.2164 
Beveridge 0.3366 0.4727 0 1 
Age 69.0065 9.6321 29 90 
Age < 64 (reference group) 0.3310 0.4707 0 1 
Age 65–69  0.1718 0.3773 0 1 
Age 70–74 0.1820 0.3860 0 1 
Age 75–79 0.1564 0.3633 0 1 
Age 80–84 0.1173 0.3219 0 1 
Age 85–90 0.0414 0.1993 0 1 
Obesity 0.2356 0.4245 0 1 
Forgo treatment due to costs 0.0887 0.2843 0 1 
Age at first diagnosis of cardiovascular disease 57.7640 13.7093 0 88 
Consulted heart specialist recently 0.3520 0.4777 0 1 
Wished treatment to be earlier 0.4682 0.4999 0 1 
Depression ever 0.2981 0.4575 0 1 
     
Sample size=2,148     
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Table 2b 
Descriptive statistics for Complementary analysis (Wave 5)   
  Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome variables     
Good health (US-scale) 0.2987 0.4577 0 1 
Health not poor (US-scale) 0.7063 0.4555 0 1 
Depression 0.4835 0.4998 0 1 
Suicidal feeling 0.1186 0.3233 0 1 
Fatigue 0.5331 0.4990 0 1 
Irritability 0.3560 0.4789 0 1 
Appetite 0.1317 0.3382 0 1 
Insomnia 0.4544 0.4980 0 1 
Concentration on entertainment 0.1716 0.3770 0 1 
Concentration on reading 0.1825 0.3863 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years 0.4899 0.3186 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years (adjusted) 0.4930 0.2564 0.01 0.99 
Probability of living after ten years = 0 0.0930 0.2905 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years = 1 0.0849 0.2787 0 1 
 
    
Explanatory variables     
Long wait 0.1079 0.3103 0 1 
High cost 0.0729 0.2600 0 1 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost) 0.0310 0.1732 0 1 
Male 0.5600 0.4964 0 1 
High educated 0.1199 0.3250 0 1 
ln(total household income) 6.2206 1.7624 0.3763 39.92658 
Beveridge 0.2246 0.4173 0 1 
Age 71.1689 9.3147 42 90 
Age < 64 (reference group) 0.2514 0.4339 0 1 
Age 65–69  0.1680 0.3739 0 1 
Age 70–74 0.1914 0.3934 0 1 
Age 75–79 0.1782 0.3827 0 1 
Age 80–84 0.1367 0.3435 0 1 
Age 85–90 0.0744 0.2624 0 1 
Obesity 0.3022 0.4593 0 1 
Age at first diagnosis of cardiovascular disease 56.7740 14.8045 0 87 
     
Sample size=5,393     
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Table 2c 
Descriptive statistics for Complementary analysis (Wave 6)   
  Mean SD Min Max 
Outcome variables     
Good health (US-scale) 0.2809 0.4495 0 1 
Health not poor (US-scale) 0.7037 0.4567 0 1 
Depression 0.4911 0.5000 0 1 
Suicidal feeling 0.1102 0.3131 0 1 
Fatigue 0.5437 0.4981 0 1 
Irritability 0.3495 0.4769 0 1 
Appetite 0.1439 0.3510 0 1 
Insomnia 0.4546 0.4980 0 1 
Concentration on entertainment 0.1662 0.3723 0 1 
Concentration on reading 0.1862 0.3893 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years 0.5001 0.3122 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years (adjusted) 0.4981 0.2512 0.01 0.99 
Probability of living after ten years = 0 0.0838 0.2771 0 1 
Probability of living after ten years = 1 0.0869 0.2817 0 1 
 
    
Explanatory variables 
    
Long wait 0.1503 0.3574 0 1 
High cost 0.0754 0.2641 0 1 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost) 0.0437 0.2044 0 1 
Male 0.5527 0.4973 0 1 
High educated 0.1010 0.3014 0 1 
ln(total household income) 5.8511 1.4897 0.1554  12.0709 
Beveridge 0.2325 0.4224 0 1 
Age 72.0831 9.2616 37 90 
Age < 64 (reference group) 0.2190 0.4136 0 1 
Age 65–69  0.1672 0.3732 0 1 
Age 70–74 0.1817 0.3856 0 1 
Age 75–79 0.1911 0.3932 0 1 
Age 80–84 0.1525 0.3595 0 1 
Age 85–90 0.0885 0.2840 0 1 
Obesity 0.3028 0.4595 0 1 
Age at first diagnosis of cardiovascular disease 55.4806 15.4836 0 89 
     
Sample size=5,515     
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Appendix III: Regression tables from the main analysis 
Table 3   
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived physical and general health (non-emergency) 
 
  
Good health 
(EU-scale) 
Health not poor  
(EU-scale) 
Good health 
(US-scale) 
Health not poor  
(US-scale) 
Chest pain Breathlessness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Waiting times (weeks) -0.00022 0.01052 -0.00021 0.00320  0.00785* 0.01480***  0.00566** 0.00465 0.00492  0.00539 0.00519 0.00549 
 (-0.04) (1.43) (-0.05) (0.63) (1.68) (2.86) (2.34) (1.36) (0.92) (0.70) (1.00) (0.81) 
Male 
 0.08728  -0.00846  0.06950   0.05814  -0.03995 
 -0.03249 
 
 (1.26)  (-0.11)  (0.92)  (0.86)  (-0.50) 
 (-0.44) 
High educated 
 0.10629  0.04918   0.17489  0.02116  0.06084 
 0.12276 
 
 (0.86)  (0.55)  (1.55)  (0.25)  (0.49) 
 (1.05) 
ln(total household income) 
 0.01553    0.04547**  0.03185*  0.05358***   0.01229  
 0.00928  
 
 (0.86)  (2.50)  (1.69)  (3.14)  (0.67) 
 (0.50) 
Beveridge 
 -0.11290  -0.04335  0.08714  -0.03375  -0.14813*  
 -0.08898  
 
 (-1.57)  (-0.54)  (1.13)  (-0.47)  (-1.78) 
 (-1.17) 
Age  -0.00367  -0.00745  -0.00848*  -0.00006  -0.00006 
 0.00233  
 
 (-0.82)  (-1.51)  (-1.76)  (-0.01)  (-0.01) 
 (0.47) 
Obesity 
 0.02750  0.11243   -0.09458  0.10623  0.02987 
 0.15433* 
 
 (0.35)  (1.50)  (-1.20)  (1.64)  (0.36) 
 (1.82) 
Forgo treatment due to costs 
 -0.05347  -0.22259   -0.21792**  -0.25691*  0.27388*  
 0.08983  
 
 (-0.50)  (-1.49)  (-2.30)  (-1.68)  (1.97) 
 (0.64) 
Age at first diagnosis 
 0.00068  0.00244  0.00195  0.00126   0.00401 
 0.00335 
 
 (0.24)  (0.78)  (0.66)  (0.44)  (1.30) 
 (1.09) 
Consulted heart specialist recently 
 0.06608  -0.08856  0.00091    0.00151  0.18314** 
 -0.00575 
 
 (0.86)  (-1.15)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (2.21) 
 (-0.07) 
Wished treatment to be earlier 
 -0.19635**  -0.08026  -0.20061**  0.00941  0.05853 
 0.08452 
 
 (-2.51)  (-0.97)  (-2.42)  (0.13)  (0.69) 
 (1.06) 
Constant 0.27314*** 0.37842 0.70971***  0.82290*** 0.35347***  0.63633** 0.75058***  0.29486 0.36601*** -0.00412 0.27575*** -0.19221 
 (7.42) (1.18) (20.01) (2.72) (9.09) (2.01) (22.84) (0.99) (9.33) (-0.01) (7.56) (-0.62) 
Prob > F 0.9673 0.0158 0.9627 0.0405 0.0939 0.0000 0.0204 0.0148  0.3588 0.0728 0.3178 0.1924 
             
Observations n=213 n=170 n=213 n=170 n=211 n=168 n=211 n=168 n=213 n=170 n=213 n=170 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-
numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 4   
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived physical and general health (emergency) 
 
  
Good health  
(EU-scale) 
Health not poor  
(EU-scale) 
Good health  
(US-scale) 
Health not poor  
(US-scale) 
Chest pain Breathlessness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
            
Waiting times (days) -0.00175  -0.00376* -0.00344 -0.00511 -0.00317* -0.00529** -0.00528 -0.00615 -0.00312 -0.00203 0.00091 -0.00066 
 (-1.11) (-1.90) (-0.92) (-1.29) (-1.91) (-2.60) (-1.34) (-1.62) (-0.88) (-0.47) (0.27) (-0.22) 
Male 
 0.25190***  0.11015  0.25583***   0.01248  0.05622  -0.06750 
 
 (4.11)  (1.23)  (3.46)  (0.15)  (0.62)  (-0.74) 
High educated 
  0.17890   0.18582  0.26032**  0.06859  -0.10500  -0.00148 
 
 (1.43)  (1.57)  (2.10)  (0.61)  (-0.74)  (-0.01) 
ln(total household income) 
 0.00313  -0.01486  0.01810  -0.01194  -0.00447  0.01129 
 
 (0.16)  (-0.59)  (0.84)  (-0.51)  (-0.17)  (0.45) 
Beveridge 
 0.04073  -0.06192  0.12062  0.16233*   -0.03898  0.11942 
 
 (0.63)  (-0.67)  (1.54)  (1.87)  (-0.43)  (1.28) 
Age 
 -0.00789**  0.00103  -0.00112  -0.00362  -0.00509  0.00338 
 
 (-2.16)  (0.23)  (-0.23)  (-0.85)  (-0.90)  (0.69) 
Obesity 
 0.10710   -0.18970*  -0.01633  -0.13505  0.07851  0.22819** 
 
 (1.44)  (-1.90)  (-0.20)  (-1.43)  (0.80)  (2.13) 
Forgo treatment due to costs 
 -0.12509*  -0.22938*  0.01484  -0.27364**  0.10739  0.13919  
 
 (-1.84)  (-1.89)  (0.14)  (-2.47)  (0.99)  (1.14) 
Age at first diagnosis 
 0.00566***  -0.00327  0.00113  -0.00463**  0.00598  0.00054 
 
 (2.64)  (-1.22)  (0.35)  (-2.01)  (1.42)  (0.16) 
Constant 0.19422*** 0.21397 0.60461*** 0.83860** 0.26561*** -0.02720 0.69742*** 1.28389*** 0.64114*** 0.62837 0.46641*** 0.05325 
 (5.76) (0.77) (13.88) (2.15) (7.04) (-0.09) (16.90) (3.53) (15.13) (1.48) (10.66) (0.14) 
Prob > F 0.2688 0.0003 0.3564 0.0058 0.0580 0.0000 0.1828 0.0013 0.3827 0.6189 0.7879  0.3290 
 
            
Observations n=157 n=135 n=157 n=135 n=157 n=135 n=157 n=135 n=157 n=135 n=157 n=135 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered 
columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 5a  
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived mental health (non-emergency) 
 
                  
  Depression Suicidal feeling Fatigue Irritability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Waiting times (weeks) -0.00419 -0.00521 0.00489 0.00502 0.00011 -0.00483 0.00068 -0.00318 
 (-0.85) (-0.82) (1.03) (0.84) (0.02) (-0.65) (0.13) (-0.52) 
Male  -0.16818**  -0.02627  -0.15040*  0.08998 
 
 (-2.00)  (-0.46)  (-1.80)  (1.22) 
High educated  -0.11293  -0.03693  -0.15977  0.03012 
 
 (-0.95)  (-0.46)  (-1.46)  (0.25) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00564  0.00035  -0.02705  -0.00981 
 
 (-0.27)  (0.03)  (-1.25)  (-0.45) 
Beveridge  -0.08872  -0.02042  -0.04993  -0.03433 
 
 (-1.00)  (-0.36)  (-0.56)  (-0.43) 
Age  -0.00644  0.00406  0.00190  0.00874* 
 
 (-1.28)  (0.99)  (0.35)  (1.81) 
Obesity  0.04492  -0.11209**  -0.00250  -0.00742 
 
 (0.52)  (-2.32)  (-0.03)  (-0.10) 
Forgo treatment due to costs  0.01904  0.09301  0.06615  0.30215** 
 
 (0.14)  (0.71)  (0.43)  (2.07) 
Depression ever  0.12985       
 
 (1.40)       
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00052  -0.00407  0.00068  -0.00802** 
 
 (-0.17)  (-1.39)  (0.22)  (-2.53) 
Consulted heart specialist recently  -0.09820  -0.03184  0.02895  -0.02311 
  (-1.07)  (-0.62)  (0.34)  (-0.30) 
Wished treatment to be earlier  0.10806  0.09018  0.08797  0.18199** 
  (1.17)  (1.52)  (0.95)  (2.20) 
Constant 0.49692*** 1.09501*** 0.11265*** 0.08199 0.46847*** 0.55195 0.30988*** 0.12503 
 (12.34) (3.03) (4.03) (0.38) (11.58) (1.50) (8.24) (0.36) 
Prob > F 0.3968 0.0090 0.3052 0.1150 0.9835 0.0469 0.8937 0.0067 
 
        
Observations n=208 n=164 n=205 n=163 n=209 n=166 n=208 n=165 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p≤0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 5b  
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived mental health (non-emergency) 
 
                  
  
Appetite Insomnia Concentration on entertainment Concentration on reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Waiting times (weeks) 0.00078 0.00094 0.00121 -0.00671 0.00549  0.00081 0.00276 -0.00288 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (-0.99) (1.12) (0.13) (0.61) (-0.65) 
Male  -0.08136  -0.16337**  0.02923  -0.07687 
 
 (-1.50)  (-1.99)  (0.45)  (-1.02) 
High educated  -0.06410  0.09469  0.01753  -0.14393* 
 
 (-0.79)  (0.76)  (0.18)  (-1.77) 
ln(total household income)  0.01421  -0.01676  0.00715  0.01563 
 
 (1.11)  (-0.74)  (0.45)  (0.70) 
Beveridge  -0.09184  -0.02840  0.00447  0.03193 
 
 (-1.39)  (-0.32)  (0.06)  (0.40) 
Age  0.00633  0.00081  0.00074  -0.00120 
 
 (1.50)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (-0.24) 
Obesity  -0.02797  -0.05637  -0.07203  0.00550 
 
 (-0.51)  (-0.66)  (-1.09)  (0.07) 
Forgo treatment due to costs  0.00821  -0.00208  0.21719  0.11652 
 
 (0.07)  (-0.01)  (1.51)  (0.76) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00241  -0.00164  0.00004  0.00262 
 
 (-0.82)  (-0.46)  (0.02)  (1.10) 
Consulted heart specialist recently  -0.03638  -0.00586  -0.02488  -0.10239 
  (-0.67)  (-0.07)  (-0.36)  (-1.41) 
Wished treatment to be earlier  -0.00869  0.21568**  0.06678  -0.01101 
  (-0.14)  (2.35)  (0.88)  (-0.13) 
Constant 0.13097*** -0.14657 0.44990*** 0.64512* 0.18371*** 0.04834 0.24297*** 0.16940  
 (4.76) (-0.56) (11.17) (1.66) (5.77) (0.16) (7.20) (0.46) 
Prob > F 0.8388 0.4443 0.8258 0.1284 0.2647 0.8045 0.5424 0.2897 
 
        
Observations n=209 n=166 n=209 n=166 n=210 n=167 n=209 n=166 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
53 
 
Table 5c   
Effect of waiting times in Wave 1 on self-perceived mental health in Wave 2 (non-emergency) 
                  
  
Depression (Wave 2) Suicidal feeling (Wave 2) Fatigue (Wave 2) Irritability (Wave 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Waiting times (weeks in Wave 1) 0.00278 0.00787** -0.00072 -0.00097 0.00590** 0.00358 0.00490 0.00219 
 (0.82) (2.11) (-0.59) (-0.65) (2.34) (1.22) (1.59) (0.67) 
Depression (Wave 1)  0.48571***       
 
 (5.74)       
Suicidal feeling (Wave 1)    0.38407**     
 
   (2.34)     
Fatigue (Wave 1)      0.18235*   
 
     (1.88)   
Irritability (Wave 1)        0.19546** 
 
       (2.14) 
Male  0.07732  0.01286  -0.00534  0.12616 
 
 (0.82)  (0.27)  (-0.05)  (1.64) 
High educated  -0.08537  0.05415  -0.18102  0.03373 
 
 (-0.85)  (0.65)  (-1.50)  (0.28) 
ln(total household income)  -0.04214  -0.00603  -0.03852  -0.00155 
 
 (-1.56)  (-0.49)  (-1.27)  (-0.05) 
Beveridge  -0.04298  0.02048  0.08255  0.12702 
 
 (-0.45)  (0.33)  (0.77)  (1.35) 
Age  0.00525  -0.00252  0.00092  -0.00134 
 
 (1.01)  (-1.09)  (0.14)  (-0.25) 
Obesity  -0.17674  0.08544  -0.08293  0.18535 
 
 (-1.55)  (1.08)  (-0.69)  (1.44) 
Forgo treatment due to costs (wave 1) -0.11871  0.09233  0.13087  0.09574 
 
 (-0.84)  (0.78)  (0.91)  (0.61) 
Depression ever  0.22850**       
 
 (2.54)       
Age at first diagnosis  0.00006  0.00054  0.00034  -0.00371 
 
 (0.01)  (0.21)  (0.07)  (-0.90) 
Constant 0.36074*** -0.13010 0.07854*** 0.18472 0.39334*** 0.44654 0.23458*** 0.29949 
 (7.79) (-0.36) (3.15) (1.06) (8.52) (0.99) (5.74) (0.78) 
Prob > F 0.4163 0.0000 0.5550 0.5427 0.0209 0.0086 0.1153 0.0175 
 
        
Observations n=133 n=112 n=134 n=110 n=134 n=113 n=134 n=113 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered 
columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 5d   
Effect of waiting times in Wave 1 on self-perceived mental health in Wave 2 (non-emergency) 
                  
  
Appetite (Wave 2) Insomnia (Wave 2) 
Concentration on entertain-
ment  
(Wave 2) 
Concentration on reading  
(Wave 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Waiting times (weeks in Wave 1) 0.00389 0.00321 0.00196 -0.00051 0.00266 -0.00101 0.00448 0.00177 
 (1.19) (1.03) (0.56) (-0.11) (0.76) (-0.23) (1.40) (0.45) 
Appetite (Wave 1)  .12419       
 
 (0.72)       
Insomnia (Wave 1)    0.40011***     
 
   (4.14)     
Concentration on entertainment (Wave 1)     0.07504   
 
     (0.71)   
Concentration on reading (Wave 1)        0.31461*** 
 
       (2.93) 
Male  0.04163  -0.00349  0.04628  -0.06161 
 
 (1.00)  (-0.04)  (0.58)  (-0.69) 
High educated  0.00792  -0.00077  0.04316  0.17402 
 
 (0.14)  (-0.01)  (0.39)  (1.28) 
ln(total household income)  -0.02835**  -0.03071  -0.01893  -0.01008 
 
 (-2.16)  (-0.98)  (-0.57)  (-0.34) 
Beveridge  0.02451  0.14884  0.14930  0.18131* 
 
 (0.43)  (1.36)  (1.41)  (1.81) 
Age  -0.00223  -0.00124  0.00503  0.00209 
 
 (-1.31)  (-0.22)  (1.00)  (0.39) 
Obesity  -0.01277  -0.15739  -0.02268  -0.07194 
 
 (-0.25)  (-1.62)  (-0.24)  (-0.72) 
Forgo treatment due to costs (wave 1)  0.11645  0.03903  0.14743  0.14318 
 
 (0.93)  (0.28)  (0.90)  (1.15) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00046  0.00073  -0.00023  -0.00332 
 
 (-0.22)  (0.14)  (-0.05)  (-0.74) 
Constant 0.04605* 0.34827** 0.36248*** 0.37354 0.17347*** -0.13573 0.24622*** 0.24465 
 (1.76) (2.03) (7.85) (0.81) (4.50) (-0.30) (5.86) (0.57) 
Prob > F 0.2381 0.6031 0.5781 0.0004 0.4499 0.5414 0.1635 0.0068 
 
        
Observations n=134 n=113 n=134 n=113 n=134 n=112 n=134 n=112 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 6a   
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived mental health (emergency) 
 
                  
  
Depression Suicidal feeling Fatigue Irritability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Waiting times (days) 0.00501*** 0.00504** 0.00085 0.00331 0.00379* 0.00524* 0.00848*** 0.00869*** 
 (2.86) (2.44) (0.30) (1.01) (1.76) (1.94) (3.86) (3.62) 
Male  -0.28064***  -0.26345***  -0.27512***  -0.07260 
 
 (-3.29)  (-3.48)  (-3.13)  (-0.84) 
High educated  0.01156  -0.01395  -0.20863*  -0.17767 
 
 (0.08)  (-0.15)  (-1.79)  (-1.29) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00081  -0.00094  0.00244  -0.00491 
 
 (-0.03)  (-0.04)  (0.10)  (-0.18) 
Beveridge  -0.03865  -0.11096  -0.02754  -0.12276 
 
 (-0.46)  (-1.48)  (-0.32)  (-1.39) 
Age  -0.00061  -0.00009  0.00347  -0.00873 
 
 (-0.12)  (-0.02)  (0.68)  (-1.62) 
Obesity  -0.02358  0.16152*  -0.11529  -0.02946 
 
 (-0.25)  (1.79)  (-1.15)  (-0.30) 
Forgo treatment due to costs  0.05139  0.20896  0.24521**  0.05936 
 
 (0.44)  (1.62)  (2.19)  (0.47) 
Depression ever  0.11041       
 
 (1.23)       
Age at first diagnosis  0.00178  0.00196  -0.00157  0.00072 
 
 (0.44)  (0.82)  (-0.41)  (0.19) 
Constant 0.61158*** 0.66952* 0.27462*** 0.25529 0.54723*** 0.56593 0.36692*** 1.04280** 
 (14.53) (1.84) (7.02) (0.79) (12.71) (1.56) (8.78) (2.62) 
Prob > F 0.0048 0.0025 0.7681 0.0001 0.0804 0.0001 0.0002 0.0161 
 
        
Observations n=155 n=133 n=154 n=132 n=155 n=133 n=155 n=133 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 6b  
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived mental health (emergency) 
 
                  
  
Appetite Insomnia Concentration on entertainment Concentration on reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Waiting times (days) 0.00395 0.00223 0.00641*** 0.00716*** 0.00244 0.00374 0.00381 0.00560 
 (1.17) (0.88) (3.22) (3.38) (0.84) (1.15) (1.07) (1.33) 
Male  -0.08599  -0.30932***  0.07501  0.02583 
 
 (-1.08)  (-3.50)  (0.96)  (0.34) 
High educated  -0.09644  0.00521  -0.05963  -0.00481 
 
 (-1.30)  (0.04)  (-0.58)  (-0.04) 
ln(total household income)  0.00114  0.00748  -0.02419  -0.00742 
 
 (0.05)  (0.29)  (-1.21)  (-0.37) 
Beveridge  -0.04290  -0.07508  -0.02538  0.00417 
 
 (-0.61)  (-0.85)  (-0.36)  (0.06) 
Age  -0.00053  0.00504  0.00257  0.00113 
 
 (-0.17)  (0.97)  (0.68)  (0.33) 
Obesity  0.17571*  0.05572  0.04458  0.22252** 
 
 (1.82)  (0.55)  (0.50)  (2.30) 
Forgo treatment due to costs  -0.01613  0.05961  0.32128**  0.51433*** 
 
 (-0.16)  (0.51)  (2.63)  (4.80) 
Age at first diagnosis  0.00269  -0.00473  0.00018  0.00192  
 
 (1.16)  (-1.19)  (0.07)  (0.94) 
Constant 0.17861***  0.09261 0.50076*** 0.53159 0.20613*** 0.09805 0.25360*** -0.03272 
 (5.21) (0.33) (11.54) (1.33) (5.89) (0.36) (6.51) (-0.12) 
Prob > F 0.2425 0.0815 0.0016 0.0007 0.4045 0.1253 0.2861  0.0000 
 
        
Observations n=155 n=133 n=155 n=133 n=155 n=133 n=153 n=132 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 6c   
Effect of waiting times in Wave 1 on self-perceived mental health in Wave 2 (emergency) 
                  
  Depression (Wave 2) Suicidal feeling (Wave 2) Fatigue (Wave 2) Irritability (Wave 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Waiting times (days in Wave 1) 0.00244 0.00097 -0.00079 -0.00252 0.00449** 0.00527** -0.00008 -0.00543 
 (0.92) (0.34) (-0.32) (-1.23) (2.15) (2.44) (-0.03) (-1.59) 
Depression (Wave 1)  0.15979       
 
 (1.17)       
Suicidal feeling (Wave 1)    0.52545***     
 
   (4.18)     
Fatigue (Wave 1)      0.43650***   
 
     (3.89)   
Irritability (Wave 1)        0.44169*** 
 
       (3.93) 
Male  -0.03397  0.01873  -0.22468**  0.06729 
 
 (-0.28)  (0.23)  (-2.08)  (0.62) 
High educated  0.13571  -0.06598  0.08473  0.01540 
 
 (0.88)  (-0.94)  (0.59)  (0.12) 
ln(total household income)  -0.04568  -0.01016  -0.04751  0.00100 
 
 (-1.29)  (-0.40)  (-1.46)  (0.03) 
Beveridge  0.05957  0.04831  -0.01996  0.09721 
 
 (0.52)  (0.56)  (-0.18)  (0.84) 
Age  -0.00241  0.00026  -0.00091  -0.00030 
 
 (-0.35)  (0.05)  (-0.16)  (-0.04) 
Obesity  -0.04861  -0.12028  -0.02937  -0.03151 
 
 (-0.36)  (-1.56)  (-0.29)  (-0.22) 
Forgo treatment due to costs (wave 1) 0.30524*  0.12376  0.01920  -0.06920 
 
 (2.00)  (0.78)  (0.13)  (-0.39) 
Depression ever  0.21217*       
 
 (1.69)       
Age at first diagnosis  0.00221  0.00354  -0.00933***  0.00104 
 
 (0.56)  (1.64)  (-2.82)  (0.28) 
Constant 0.51067*** 0.60965 0.21750*** -0.04716 0.55667*** 1.25786*** 0.38158*** 0.13277 
 (9.39) (1.10) (4.79) (-0.12) (10.39) (3.04) (7.14) (0.23) 
Prob > F 0.3593 0.0093 0.7529 0.0006 0.0342 0.0000 0.9791 0.0457 
 
        
Observations n=104 n=84 n=104 n=84 n=105 n=84 n=105 n=84 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered 
columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 6d   
Effect of waiting times in Wave 1 on self-perceived mental health in Wave 2 (emergency) 
                  
  
Appetite (Wave 2) Insomnia (Wave 2) 
Concentration on entertainment 
(Wave 2) 
Concentration on reading  
(Wave 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Waiting times (days in Wave 1) -0.00162 -0.00090 0.00406 0.00228 0.00014 -0.00013 -0.00254 -0.00305 
 (0.87) (-0.47) (1.65) (0.71) (0.06) (-0.05) (-1.24) (-1.41) 
Appetite (Wave 1)  0.11828       
 
 (0.89)       
Insomnia (Wave 1)    0.35297***     
 
   (2.74)     
Concentration on entertainment (Wave 1)     0.22336*   
 
     (1.71)   
Concentration on reading (Wave 1)        0.26373** 
 
       (2.01) 
Male  -0.08143  -0.17642  -0.05159  -0.08702 
 
 (-0.78)  (-1.31)  (-0.57)  (-0.97) 
High educated  0.10289  -0.00761  0.12566  -0.07431 
 
 (0.86)  (-0.06)  (0.95)  (-0.74) 
ln(total household income)  -0.05150  -0.00134  -0.06000*  -0.00070 
 
 (-1.48)  (-0.04)  (-1.93)  (-0.02) 
Beveridge  0.04660  -0.02833  0.03887  0.00661 
 
 (0.48)  (-0.25)  (0.43)  (0.08) 
Age  0.00771  0.00267  -0.00229  0.00278 
 
 (1.48)  (0.37)  (-0.42)  (0.56) 
Obesity  0.04020  0.09858  -0.13807  0.01686 
 
 (0.34)  (0.82)  (-1.49)  (0.17) 
Forgo treatment due to costs (wave 1)  -0.02859  0.13105  0.32590*  0.40974** 
 
 (-0.19)  (0.82)  (1.96)  (2.44) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00524  -0.00016  0.00219  -0.00243 
 
 (-1.30)  (-0.04)  (0.99)  (-0.55) 
Constant 0.21217 0.29959 0.45519*** 0.20355 0.26560*** 0.58616 0.28946*** 0.11929 
 (4.85) (0.76) (8.44) (0.38) (5.64) (1.40) (5.93) (0.37) 
Prob > F 0.3850 0.4107 0.1022 0.0009 0.9538 0.0114 0.2193 0.0041 
         
Observations n=105 n=84 n=105 n=85 n=105 n=84 n=103 n=82 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 7   
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived life expectancy (non-emergency) 
                  
  
𝐿𝑖𝑗   𝑙𝑖𝑗    𝑙1,𝑖𝑗  𝑙0,𝑖𝑗   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Waiting times (weeks) -0.00400 0.00124 -0.00799*** -0.00533 0.00260 0.00500 -0.00137 -0.00462 
 (-0.85) (0.18) (-2.93) (-1.39) (0.48) (0.64) (-0.56) (-1.19) 
Male  -0.04014  -0.01153  -0.02103  0.02507 
 
 (-0.75)  (-0.25)  (-0.38)  (0.47) 
High educated  -0.05593  0.06627  -0.05101  0.13044 
 
 (-0.67)  (0.99)  (-0.70)  (1.25) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00246  0.00856  -0.00883  0.00623 
 
 (-0.17)  (0.62)  (-0.63)  (0.49) 
Beveridge  0.00034  -0.03172  0.02944  -0.01530 
 
 (0.01)  (-0.55)  (0.42)  (-0.23) 
Age 65–69   -0.07985  -0.04927  -0.03264  0.04760 
 
 (-1.04)  (-0.79)  (-0.40)  (0.77) 
Age 70–74  -0.16226*  -0.10488  -0.02324  0.15383* 
 
 (-1.91)  (-1.44)  (-0.26)  (1.90) 
Age 75–79  -0.26982***  -0.16458**  -0.07101  0.21093** 
 
 (-3.33)  (-2.08)  (-0.93)  (2.06) 
Age 80–84  -0.21953*  -0.05418  0.06780  0.40378*** 
 
 (-1.74)  (-0.43)  (0.62)  (2.93) 
Age 85–90  -0.58639***    -0.07187  1.05945*** 
 
 (-5.92)    (-0.64)  (9.76) 
Obesity  -0.03951  -0.09075*  0.10298  0.04526 
 
 (-0.67)  (-1.84)  (1.55)  (0.79) 
Forgo treatment due to costs  -0.15179**  -0.07331  -0.11957**  0.09738 
 
 (-2.00)  (-1.01)  (-2.32)  (0.87) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00103  -0.00012  -0.00614**  -0.00386 
 
 (-0.37)  (-0.04)  (-2.11)  (-1.28) 
Consulted heart specialist recently  -0.00314  -0.00965  0.00843  -0.03416 
 
 (-0.06)  (-0.21)  (0.16)  (-0.62) 
Wished treatment to be earlier  -0.09910  -0.07328  -0.04008  0.04225 
 
 (-1.50)  (-1.24)  (-0.58)  (0.66) 
Constant 0.50586*** 0.78993*** 0.53515*** 0.62590*** 0.09373*** 0.52357** 0.13545*** 0.15263 
 (17.89) (3.94) (23.67) (2.86) (3.23) (2.41) (4.94) (0.80) 
Prob > F 0.3962 0.0000 0.0040 0.0001 0.6332 0.4520 0.5751 0.0000 
 
        
Observations n=184 n=145 n=140 n=109 n=184 n=145 n=184 n=145 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from 
multivariate regression with control variables. 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is defined as “probability of living after ten years”; 𝑙𝑖𝑗 is the adjusted version of 𝐿𝑖𝑗; 𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten years 
= 1; 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten years = 0. 
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Table 8   
Effect of waiting times on self-perceived life expectancy (emergency)     
                  
  
𝐿𝑖𝑗   𝑙𝑖𝑗    𝑙1,𝑖𝑗  𝑙0,𝑖𝑗   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
      
  
Waiting times (days) -0.00111 -0.00446*** -0.00218** -0.00351** 0.00052 -0.00228* -0.00082 0.00054 
 (-0.59) (-2.82) (-2.05) (-2.56) (0.22) (-1.80) (-0.58) (0.28) 
Male  0.13790**  0.10313**  0.04879  -0.09267 
 
 (2.49)  (2.01)  (0.93)  (-1.61) 
High educated  0.05116  0.05692  -0.07579  -0.07666 
 
 (0.59)  (0.67)  (-0.97)  (-1.50) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00924  -0.00228  0.00557  0.01908 
 
 (-0.60 )  (-0.18)  (0.35)  (0.97) 
Beveridge  -0.00185  0.01172  -0.03722  -0.00469 
 
 (-0.03)  (0.23)  (-0.66)  (-0.07) 
Age 65–69   -0.14116*  -0.05616  -0.19861***  0.01637 
 
 (-1.85)  (-0.79)  (-3.10)  (0.20) 
Age 70–74  -0.11287  -0.10671  -0.09678  -0.03218 
 
 (-1.29)  (-1.46)  (-0.93)  (-0.50) 
Age 75–79  -0.26855***  -0.16819**  -0.19860***  0.09105 
 
 (-3.25)  (-2.06)  (-3.03)  (0.97) 
Age 80–84  -0.12320  -0.02115  -0.14990**  0.06838 
 
 (-1.09)  (-0.20)  (-2.00)  (0.50) 
Age 85–90  -0.17528  0.04416  -0.20727**  0.25320 
 
 (-1.10 )  (0.30)  (-2.61)  (1.25) 
Obesity  -0.10984*  -0.08841  -0.01934  0.12026 
 
 (-1.79)  (-1.56)  (-0.31)  (1.38) 
Forgo treatment due to costs  -0.12376  -0.00010  -0.12142***  0.12063 
 
 (-1.48)  (-0.00)  (-2.66)  (1.08) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00205  -0.00230  -0.00064  0.00007 
 
 (-0.81)  (-1.01)  (-0.36)  (0.03) 
Constant 0.44333*** 0.70407*** 0.45446*** 0.61011*** 0.08928*** 0.22711 0.13225*** -0.02495 
 (15.22) (4.11) (18.04) (4.23) (3.28) (1.31) (4.36) (-0.13) 
Prob > F 0.5565  0.0017 0.0426 0.1274 0.8236 0.4683 0.5598 0.2596 
 
        
Observations n=141 n=123 n=110 n=97 n=141 n=123 n=141 n=123 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from 
multivariate regression with control variables. 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is defined as “probability of living after ten years”; 𝑙𝑖𝑗 is the adjusted version of 𝐿𝑖𝑗; 𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten 
years = 1; 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten years = 0. 
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Appendix IV: Regression tables from the complementary analysis 
Table 9   
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived general health 
 
   Wave 5 (2013)      Wave 6 (2015)   
  Good health (US-scale) Health not poor (US-scale)   Good health (US-scale) Health not poor (US-scale) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
    
 
    
Long wait -0.16126*** -0.22837*** -0.11935*** -0.13599**  -0.14361*** -0.11817** -0.12622*** -0.11427** 
 (-9.78) (-5.08) (-5.60) (-2.46)  (-9.96) (-2.44) (-6.91) (-2.03) 
High cost  -0.24790***  -0.35375***  
 -0.00015  0.00021 
 
 (-4.57)  (-4.47)  
 (-0.00)  (0.00) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  0.24673**  0.28174**  
 0.00695  0.08964 
 
 (2.50)  (2.03)  
 (0.07)  (0.84) 
Male  0.05075**  0.05396**  
 0.01101  0.10395*** 
 
 (1.96)  (2.20)  
 (0.33)  (2.86) 
High educated  0.06359  0.07524**  
 0.13560**  0.15641*** 
 
 (1.62)  (2.59)  
 (2.29)  (3.28) 
ln(total household income)  0.03645***  0.03199***  
 0.02273**  0.02799*** 
 
 (4.52)  (4.29)  
 (2.16)  (2.66) 
Beveridge  0.02200  -0.00398  
 -0.06396  -0.00738 
 
 (0.83)  (-0.17)  
 (-1.42)  (-0.15) 
Age  -0.00435***  -0.00417***  
 -0.00713***  -0.00546*** 
 
 (-2.86)  (-2.82)  
 (-4.06)  (-2.70) 
Obesity  -0.06983**  -0.06603**  
 0.00336  -0.03067 
 
 (-2.52)  (-2.45)  
 (0.09)  (-0.84) 
Age at first diagnosis  0.00282***  0.00221**  
 0.00400***  0.00377*** 
 
 (3.09)  (2.35)  
 (3.72)  (2.86) 
Constant 0.31762*** 0.27385** 0.72072*** 0.69532***  0.30341*** 0.45150*** 0.72429*** 0.60987*** 
 (47.13) (2.25) (110.96) (5.94)  (45.03) (3.40) (110.59) (4.21) 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
    
 
    
Observations n=5355 n=1429 n=5355 n=1429  n=5483 n=783 n=5483 n=783 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables. 
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Table 10a   
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived mental health (Wave 5) 
                  
  
Depression Suicidal feeling Fatigue Irritability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Long wait 0.14826*** 0.16442*** 0.06178*** 0.13624*** 0.18579*** 0.21287*** 0.18859*** 0.19195*** 
 (6.88) (2.89) (3.75) (2.99) (9.05) (3.81) (8.58) (3.41) 
High cost  0.26424***  0.11722*  0.22012***  0.09976 
 
 (3.50)  (1.73)  (2.79)  (1.23) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  -0.01613  -0.02424  -0.23154*  0.12529 
 
 (-0.14)  (-0.19)  (-1.66)  (0.93) 
Male  -0.18373***  -0.07487***  -0.15813***  -0.03160 
 
 (-6.74)  (-4.18)  (-5.77)  (-1.22) 
High educated  -0.00080  -0.05167***  0.00171  -0.07399** 
 
 (-0.02)  (-2.72)  (0.04)  (-2.08) 
ln(total household income)  -0.01501**  0.00471  -0.01813**  -0.01753** 
 
 (-1.81)  (0.88)  (-2.19)  (-2.21) 
Beveridge  -0.09429***  -0.04638***  0.04238  0.00435 
 
 (-3.52)  (-2.98)  (1.54)  (0.17) 
Age  -0.00202  0.00104  0.00100  -0.00447*** 
 
 (-1.25)  (1.00)  (0.61)  (-2.87) 
Obesity  0.05054*  0.02572  0.11025***  -0.00144 
 
 (1.73)  (1.33)  (3.72)  (-0.05) 
Age at first diagnosis  0.00000  -0.00007  -0.00000  -0.00103 
 
 (0.01)  (-0.11)  (-0.01)  (-1.04) 
Constant 0.46633*** 0.78752*** 0.11099*** 0.05039 0.51229*** 0.54685*** 0.33497*** 0.82108*** 
 (63.92) (6.24) (24.09) (0.58) (70.08) (4.29) (48.53) (6.81) 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
        
Observations n=5253 n=1413 n=5222 n=1409 n=5250 n=1412 n=5251 n=1413 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control 
variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 10b 
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived mental health (Wave 5) 
                  
  
Appetite Insomnia 
Concentration on entertain-
ment 
Concentration on reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Long wait 0.06891*** 0.07896* 0.16528*** 0.14609** 0.04558** 0.11632** 0.03743** 0.13021** 
 (4.01) (1.84) (7.62) (2.55) (2.54) (2.40) (2.07) (2.51) 
High cost  0.08875  0.06958  0.24399***  0.17997** 
 
 (1.44)  (0.88)  (3.16)  (2.35) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  0.05383  -0.00670  -0.10302  -0.15823 
 
 (0.44)  (-0.05)  (-0.75)  (-1.14) 
Male  -0.04641**  -0.21541***  -0.02119  -0.02402 
 
 (-2.57)  (-7.91)  (-1.03)  (-1.10) 
High educated  -0.04266**  -0.09171  -0.11425***  -0.04922 
 
 (-2.07)  (-2.43)  (-5.31)  (-1.79) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00379  0.00085  -0.00052  -0.00724 
 
 (-0.75)  (0.10)  (-0.08)  (-1.15) 
Beveridge  0.01659  -0.05892**  0.02896  0.05043** 
 
 (0.94)  (-2.20)  (1.41)  (2.33) 
Age  0.00001  -0.00149  0.00241*  0.00093 
 
 (0.01)  (-0.92)  (1.90)  (0.68) 
Obesity  -0.01832  0.07727***  0.01814  0.04703* 
 
 (-1.01)  (2.62)  (0.80)  (1.93) 
Age at first diagnosis  0.00071  -0.00004  -0.00092  -0.00065 
 
 (1.12)  (-0.04)  (-1.16)  (-0.81) 
Constant 0.12447*** 0.11133 0.43577*** 0.63934*** 0.16596*** 0.04578 0.17761*** 0.17217 
 (25.82) (1.34) (60.15) (5.04) (30.52) (0.46) (31.72) (1.64) 
Prob > F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0110 0.0000 0.0384 0.0004 
 
        
Observations n=5266 n=1415 n=5260 n=1414 n=5254 n=1414 n=5234 n=1405 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regres-
sion without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 11a   
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived mental health (Wave 6) 
                  
  Depression Suicidal feeling Fatigue Irritability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Long wait 0.16064*** 0.10582* 0.06559*** 0.09075** 0.11615*** 0.08304 0.13521** 0.09449 
 (8.50) (1.77) (4.67) (2.01) (6.19) (1.39) (7.03) (1.60) 
High cost  0.03224  0.17264**  0.04335  -0.00080 
 
 (0.38)  (2.30)  (0.53)  (-0.01) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  0.15091  -0.16599  0.04618  -0.05259 
 
 (1.30)  (-1.62)  (0.40)  (-0.46) 
Male  -0.18848***  -0.07767***  -0.13576***  0.04330 
 
 (-4.95)  (-2.86)  (-3.52)  (1.15) 
High educated  -0.06302  -0.04058  -0.20070***  -0.09829* 
 
 (-1.01)  (-1.14)  (-3.49)  (-1.67) 
ln(total household income)  0.00590  0.00009  -0.00914  -0.02814** 
 
 (0.49)  (0.01)  (-0.79)  (-2.41) 
Beveridge  0.00077  -0.04246  0.04147  0.06906 
 
 (0.01)  (-1.41)  (0.74)  (1.26) 
Age  0.00044  0.00144  0.00549***  -0.00347 
 
 (0.21)  (0.96)  (2.61)  (-1.62) 
Obesity  0.02174  0.06401**  0.03852  0.02744 
 
 (0.55)  (2.27)  (0.98)  (0.70) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00199  -0.00032  -0.00321**  -0.00068 
 
 (-1.43)  (-0.33)  (-2.24)  (-0.47) 
Constant 0.46628*** 0.61032*** 0.09979*** 0.05573 0.52570*** 0.43930*** 0.32890*** 0.77187*** 
 (61.71) (4.02) (21.98) (0.54) (69.49) (2.91) (46.20) (5.05) 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0194 
 
        
Observations n=5140 n=721 n=5139 n=721 n=5137 n=721 n=5137 n=721 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regres-
sion without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
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Table 11b   
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived mental health (Wave 6) 
                  
  
Appetite Insomnia 
Concentration on entertain-
ment 
Concentration on reading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Long wait 0.03178** 0.01917 0.17271*** 0.14899** 0.05118*** 0.09441* 0.06502*** 0.01229 
 (2.20) (0.45) (9.06) (2.58) (3.29) (1.86) (3.96) (0.26) 
High cost  0.05849  0.04018  0.10451  0.10154 
 
 (0.85)  (0.45)  (1.48)  (1.38) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  -0.05930  0.00144  -0.10559  0.01171 
 
 (-0.62)  (0.01)  (-1.03)  (0.11) 
Male  -0.04248  -0.15637***  -0.09591***  -0.08840*** 
 
 (-1.48)  (-4.09)  (-3.15)  (-2.73) 
High educated  -0.08751***  -0.05024  -0.04679  -0.04554 
 
 (-2.73)  (-0.83)  (-1.16)  (-1.01) 
ln(total household income)  0.00035  -0.00107  -0.00512  0.00229 
 
 (0.04)  (-0.09)  (-0.59)  (0.24) 
Beveridge  0.05490  -0.02817  0.10418**  0.10576** 
 
 (1.26)  (-0.52)  (2.18)  (2.16) 
Age  0.00331*  0.00552**  0.00529***  0.00339* 
 
 (1.93)  (2.64)  (3.19)  (1.83) 
Obesity  -0.02039  -0.04514  -0.00039  0.04616 
 
 (-0.74)  (-1.15)  (-0.01)  (1.41) 
Age at first diagnosis  -0.00129  -0.00372**  -0.00097  -0.00082 
 
 (-1.22)  (-2.60)  (-0.87)  (-0.70) 
Constant 0.13873*** 0.01261 0.42857*** 0.36323** 0.15780*** -0.08209 0.17529*** 0.01081 
 (26.50) (0.11) (57.18) (2.39) (28.58) (-0.72) (30.39) (0.09) 
Prob > F 0.0279 0.0278 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 0.0014 
 
        
Observations n=5141 n=721 n=5141 n=721 n=5140 n=721 n=5121 n=718 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression 
without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from multivariate regression with control variables.  
 
  
66 
 
Table 12:  
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived life expectancy (Wave 5) 
                
  𝐿𝑖𝑗   𝑙𝑖𝑗    𝑙1,𝑖𝑗  𝑙0,𝑖𝑗   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Long wait -0.02306 -0.01322 -0.03399** -0.04301 0.01336 0.01468 0.00593 -0.03217 
 (-1.53) (-0.37) (-2.54) (-1.39) (0.93) (0.39) (0.41) (-1.14) 
High cost  -0.12904**  -0.12731**  0.01074  0.08997 
 
 (-2.16)  (-2.37)  (0.17)  (1.32) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  0.01253  0.05633  -0.06294   0.00284 
 
 (0.12)  (0.54)  (-0.63)  (0.03) 
Male  0.01396  0.00414   -0.00714  -0.03096* 
 
 (0.77)  (0.25)  (-0.39)  (-1.83) 
High educated  -0.00091  0.01730  -0.04770**  -0.01347 
 
 (-0.04)  (0.74)  (-2.03)  (-0.67) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00142  -0.00435  -0.00252  -0.00653 
 
 (-0.26)  (-0.88)  (-0.43)  (-1.45) 
Beveridge  0.03041*  0.02149  -0.00701  -0.03401** 
 
 (1.71)  (1.32)  (-0.38)  (-2.16) 
Age 65–69   -0.03404  -0.03342   -0.01133  0.00658 
 
 (-1.30)  (-1.43)  (-0.36)  (0.34) 
Age 70–74  -0.05961**  -0.02674  -0.08469***  0.00302 
 
 (-2.29)  (-1.14)  (-3.05)  (0.14) 
Age 75–79  -0.19765***  -0.12550***  -0.14031***  0.05240** 
 
 (-7.08)  (-4.83)  (-5.37)  (2.08) 
Age 80–84  -0.22237***  -0.16593***   -0.09502***  0.09154*** 
 
 (-6.77)  (-5.46)  (-2.99)  (2.69) 
Age 85–90  -0.33319***  -0.15393***  -0.14824***  0.30056*** 
 
 (-6.89)  (-3.06)  (-3.98)  (4.99) 
Obesity  -0.05813***  -0.05492***  -0.02188  0.00049 
 
 (-2.93)  (-3.03)  (-1.08)  (0.03) 
Age at first diagnosis  0.00108  0.00039  0.00101  -0.00050 
 
 (1.57)  (0.62)  (1.56)  (-0.72) 
Constant 0.49342*** 0.56421*** 0.49646*** 0.58599*** 0.09180*** 0.14964*** 0.09923*** 0.15560*** 
 (100.23) (10.40) (112.29) (11.96) (20.53) (2.53) (21.34) (3.25) 
Prob > F 0.1271 0.0000 0.0111 0.0000 0.3530 0.0000 0.6813 0.0000 
 
      
  
Observations n=4676 n=1295 n=3773 n=1033 n=4676 n=1295 n=4676 n=1295 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from 
multivariate regression with control variables. 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is defined as “probability of living after ten years”; 𝑙𝑖𝑗 is the adjusted version of 𝐿𝑖𝑗; 𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten 
years = 1; 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten years = 0. 
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Table 13   
Effect of long hospital wait on self-perceived life expectancy (Wave 6) 
  𝐿𝑖𝑗   𝑙𝑖𝑗    𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Long wait -0.02842** -0.03591 -0.01485 -0.03083 -0.01036 -0.02678 0.02255* -0.00392 
 (-2.17) (-0.96) (-1.25) (-0.85) (-0.90) (-0.82) (1.80) (-0.12) 
High cost  -0.00632  -0.04301  0.00075  -0.05603 
 
 (-0.11)  (-0.84)  (0.01)  (-1.38) 
Interaction (Long wait*High cost)  0.04998  0.07359  -0.00591  0.01782 
 
 (0.65)  (1.03)  (-0.09)  (0.30) 
Male  0.08022***  0.05745**  -0.00315  -0.08180*** 
 
 (3.37)  (2.60)  (-0.14)  (-3.60) 
High educated  0.04803  0.06245  -0.01787  0.00458 
 
 (1.30)  (1.84)  (-0.48)  (0.13) 
ln(total household income)  -0.00271  0.00028  0.00909  0.01585*** 
 
 (-0.38)  (0.04)  (1.20)  (2.63) 
Beveridge  0.11427***  0.02908  0.12081***  -0.07200*** 
 
 (3.20)  (0.86)  (2.78)  (-3.44) 
Age 65–69   -0.07240**  -0.04914  -0.04849  0.01202 
 
 (-2.12)  (-1.56)  (-1.47)  (0.49) 
Age 70–74  -0.09883***  -0.07503**  -0.04027  0.03441 
 
 (-2.76)  (-2.29)  (-1.14)  (1.15) 
Age 75–79  -0.22772***  -0.16334***  -0.08612***  0.10567*** 
 
 (-6.67)  (-4.90)  (-3.12)  (2.82) 
Age 80–84  -0.26395***  -0.18178***  -0.06133  0.20068*** 
 
 (-5.88)  (-4.18)  (-1.58)  (3.61) 
Age 85–90  -0.35599***  -0.22504***  -0.06049  0.32081*** 
 
 (-5.80)  (-3.23)  (-1.27)  (4.03) 
Obesity  -0.00291  0.01099  -0.01200  0.01441 
 
 (-0.12)  (0.50)  (-0.55)  (0.63) 
Age at first diagnosis  0.00323***  0.00270***  0.00060  -0.00149 
 
 (3.73)  (3.11)  (0.87)  (-1.47) 
Constant 0.50474*** 0.38337*** 0.50040*** 0.37754*** 0.09534*** 0.04204 0.08652*** 0.07977 
 (103.92) (6.38) (116.04) (6.50) (20.73) (0.71) (19.65) (1.38) 
Prob > F 0.0301 0.0000 0.2121 0.0000 0.3662 0.1423 0.0721 0.0000 
 
      
  
Observations n=4786 n=689 n=3907 n=564 n=4786 n=689 n=4786 n=689 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Even-numbered columns report results from bivariate regression without control variables; odd-numbered columns report results from 
multivariate regression with control variables. 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is defined as “probability of living after ten years”; 𝑙𝑖𝑗 is the adjusted version of 𝐿𝑖𝑗; 𝑙1,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten 
years = 1; 𝑙0,𝑖𝑗 is a binary outcome variable equals to one if the respondent stated his/her probability of living after ten years = 0. 
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Appendix V: Results from the sensitivity analysis  
 
Table 14   
Re-estimated effects of different waiting time measures on health  
 
Health outcomes 
Non-emergency waiting time 
(weeks) 
  
Emergency waiting times 
(days) 
 OLS Probit   OLS Probit 
Good health (EU-scale) 0.01030* 0.01115**  -0.00323** -0.00322* 
 (1.70) (2.02)  (-2.17) (-1.66) 
Good health (US-scale) 0.01699*** 0.01910***  -0.00408*** -0.00536** 
 (3.48) (3.15)  (-2.66) (-2.05) 
Health not poor (EU-scale) 0.00360 0.00245  -0.00379 -0.00397 
 (0.80) (0.49)  (-1.12) (-1.16) 
Health not poor (US-scale) 0.00679** 0.00858*  -0.00582 -0.00589* 
 (2.36) (1.87)  (-1.66) (-1.72) 
Chest pain 0.00644 0.00647  -0.00394 -0.00393 
 (0.93) (0.99)  (-1.01) (0.273) 
Breathlessness 0.00269 0.00353  0.00111 0.00112 
 (0.42) (0.65)  (0.34) (0.34) 
Depression -0.00877 -0.00984  0.00510*** 0.00750** 
 (-1.43) (-1.40)  (3.06) (2.25) 
Depression (Wave 2) 0.00928** 0.01189***  0.00095 0.00146 
 (2.63) (3.06) 
 (0.36) (0.44) 
Suicidal feeling 0.00470 0.00320  0.00170 0.00210 
 (0.91) (1.11) 
 (0.56) (0.71) 
Suicidal feeling (Wave 2) -0.00128 -0.0007  -0.00100 -0.00011 
 (-0.87) (-1.23)  (-0.49) (-0.05) 
Fatigue -0.00689 -0.00703  0.00563*** 0.00708** 
 (-1.06) (-1.07)  (2.93) (2.35) 
Fatigue (Wave 2) 0.00565* 0.00628*  0.00483** 0.00971** 
 (1.97) (1.68)  (2.39) (2.37) 
Irritability -0.00368 -0.00404  0.00878*** 0.01130*** 
 (-0.70) (-0.73)  (3.93) (2.81) 
Irritability (Wave 2) 0.00171 0.00167  -0.00376 -0.00447 
 (0.54) (0.46)  (-1.11) (-1.25) 
Appetite 0.00026 -0.00013  0.00435 0.00454** 
 (0.06) (-0.04)  (1.37) (2.38) 
Appetite (Wave 2) 0.00399 0.0000  -0.00094 -0.00074 
 (1.25) (0.12)  (-0.45) (-0.29) 
Insomnia -0.00527 -0.00544  0.00795*** 0.01069*** 
 (-0.87) (-0.87)  (4.51) (2.94) 
Insomnia (Wave 2) 0.00039 -0.00003  0.00379 0.00453 
 (0.09) (-0.01)  (1.41) (1.32) 
Concentration on entertainment 0.00330 0.00272  0.00255 0.00247 
 (0.54) (0.59)  (0.84) (0.99) 
Concentration on entertainment (Wave 2) 0.00093 0.00063  0.00071 0.00160 
 (0.24) (0.23)  (0.27) (0.60) 
Concentration on reading -0.00147 -0.00124  0.00356 0.00363 
 (-0.28) (-0.24)  (0.93) (1.14) 
Concentration on reading (Wave 2) 0.00511 0.00512  -0.00152 -0.00163 
 (1.48) (1.59)  (-0.75) (0.53) 
Probability of living after ten years 0.00076   -0.00176  
 (0.12)   (-0.89)  
Probability of living after ten years (adjusted) -0.00623*   -0.00246**  
 (-1.68)   (-2.06)  
Probability of living after ten years = 0 -0.00442 -0.00637  -0.00037 0.00024 
 (-1.14) (-1.36)  (-0.24) (0.24) 
Probability of living after ten years = 1  0.00631 0.00530*  -0.00018 -0.00014 
 (0.99) (1.66) 
 (-0.08) (-0.05) 
 
     
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. t-statistics in brackets for linear probability model (LPM), z-statistics in brackets for Probit model. Coefficients in 
columns named "OLS" are the estimated effects of (1) non-emergency waiting times and (2) emergency waiting times on health outcomes obtained from 
OLS-regression; Coefficients in columns named "Probit" are the estimated marginal effects of (1) non-emergency waiting times and (2) emergency waiting 
times on health outcomes after probit regression.  
 
